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IN PRIVITY WITH THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: THE 
STANDING DOCTRINE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Russell W. Jacobs† 
Abstract 
This Article explores two recent Supreme Court cases—
Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc. and Golan v. Holder—and other intellectual property litigation in 
the context of the standing doctrine and the public interest. 
These cases present significant public policy questions, but 
the adversarial nature of the courts makes them ill-equipped to 
consider the multiple public interests and multiple stakeholder 
perspectives.  As a result, adjudication of these cases in the courts 
results in propertization of the intellectual property interests, the 
exclusion of non-parties from the formation of policy, and the 
exhaustion of any further policy debate after the court decision. 
This Article discusses these effects and proposes a public-
comment mechanism to mitigate the negative consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Out of all the patients, researchers, advocacy groups, and 
biomedical firms interested in expanding the uses of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genetic sequences for cancer screening and research, only 
twenty filed suit against the owner of the patents in the gene 
sequences.
1
  Out of those twenty plaintiffs, only Doctor Harry Ostrer 
survived the defendants’ challenge to standing, and thus he alone 
represented all of those interests in the litigation in which the 
Supreme Court eventually invalidated the patents in the isolated gene 
sequences.
2
  Doctor Ostrer’s case represents an emerging type of 
intellectual property litigation that departs from the typical model of a 
rights owner suing an infringer.  In such public interest impact 
litigation, the plaintiffs do not assert a private right against an alleged 
infringer.  Instead, they claim to protect the public domain from 
encroachment by private rights holders, asserting that they stand, in 
essence, in privity with the public domain.  They challenge not just 
one patent or copyright, but intellectual property protections which 
apply broadly across categories of material. 
These types of cases raise important policy questions about the 
nature of the public interest in intellectual property, who may 
properly advocate for the public interest, and the proper venues for 
defining the public interest in intellectual property.  The standing 
doctrine—the jurisdictional standard that determines who may bring a 
case to court—does not do a particularly good job sorting out these 
issues for public interest intellectual property cases.  This Article 
argues that adjudication of these cases in the courts has three effects: 
(1) propertization of intellectual property rights (the private capture 
of public interests), (2) two-party adversarial conception of the policy 
issues (the binary tendency), and (3) exhaustion of policy debate (the 
finality tendency). 
The private capture of public interests arises when either the 
owner of intellectual property or users of that intellectual property 
seek to exercise total control of the protected material.  The rights 
holder may attempt to enforce an expansive view of its rights.  
Stakeholders meanwhile may attempt to wrest control of those rights 
away from the owner, for example through public interest intellectual 
property litigation.  In both cases, the actors propertize the rights.  
 
 1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 
(2013) (affirming standing for Doctor Ostrer). 
 2. Id. (holding isolated gene sequences ineligible for patent protection under 35 
U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2013)). 
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Each side claims an interest in the material and wants to capture 
complete ownership of that interest to the exclusion of others’ 
interests in the material.  This approach to intellectual property 
prioritizes the individual interest in the material (i.e., the property 
value) at the expense of the purpose of intellectual property to benefit 
the entire public. 
The binary tendency refers to the dynamics that result from 
deciding multi-stakeholder policy decisions in courts structured to 
resolve conflicts between adversaries.  In public interest intellectual 
property cases, the court may either uphold the rights holder’s 
exclusive interest in its patent or copyright or it may find that 
intellectual property invalid—it does not have the authority to set a 
new policy outside of these two options.  Thus, when courts hear 
cases, the binary relationship between the parties excludes 
introduction of arguments about the broader implications of the 
decision on the public interest.  Public interest intellectual property 
cases typically implicate four imperfectly aligned interests: (1) an 
individual litigant’s desire to protect its private rights, (2) an 
adversary’s desire to narrow the scope of those alleged rights, (3) the 
macro-desire to build a large public domain from which the public 
may pluck, borrow, and revise, and (4) the push for a smaller public 
domain with stronger private rights to encourage the production of 
more material for the public to enjoy.
3
  In the adversarial system, 
other stakeholders, such as competitors and consumers, do not have 
the opportunity to present their inputs.  Courts do not issue their 
decisions based on the perspectives of these non-parties, instead 
allocating control of the property rights to the rights holder or to the 
challenger. 
The finality tendency refers to the likelihood that a court decision 
will offer the final word on intellectual property policy questions, 
because neither of the other branches will take up the issues raised in 
the litigation.  This occurs most strikingly when a court dismisses a 
case for lack of standing.  In such a case, the issues raised in that 
litigation remain unresolved by any forum.
4
  The courts also finally 
dispose of policy questions when they issue a decision about the 
 
 3. C.f. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2013) (where some 
copyright holders would benefit from a project to mass digitize books, while other copyright 
holders would disapprove of those efforts because of the potential loss of revenue). 
 4. See, e.g., Aharonian v. Gonzales, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1454 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(granting motion to dismiss claims challenging the validity and scope of copyright protection in 
software source code).  Congress did not address the criticism that copyright protections should 
not extend to source code. 
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constitutional or statutory soundness of a protection, since the 
legislative and executive branches tend not to review the policy issues 
raised in public interest intellectual property litigation.
5
  Although 
Congress could respond to a court decision by enacting legislation 
that changed the policy within the confines of the decision’s 
parameters, the legislature’s inaction results in the court making the 
final policy decision. 
This Article discusses patent and copyright cases that fit the 
model of public interest intellectual property litigation, including two 
recent Supreme Court cases.
6
  In Association of Molecular Pathology 
v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (Myriad), the Supreme 
Court agreed with Doctor Ostrer’s challenge to the validity of patents 
for isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences, on the basis that no 
isolated gene sequences should qualify for patent protection.
7
  In 
Golan v. Holder (Golan), the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which 
reinstated copyrights for certain foreign works whose terms had 
already lapsed under prior law.
8
 
Part I of this Article sets forth the concepts of intellectual 
property monopolies, the public domain, and the public interest.  Part 
II discusses the role of standing in public interest intellectual property 
litigation, exploring the impacts of standing on the formation of 
intellectual property public policy.  Part III proposes a public-input 
mechanism in the executive and legislative branches as a way to 
mitigate the challenges of attempting to formulate intellectual 
property laws through the courts.   
 
 5. E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of 
Copyright Term Extension Act).  Subsequent to the litigation, Congress did not address the 
policy questions raised in litigation about the usefulness of the duration of copyright terms. 
 6. Trademark cases involving the public interest fall outside the scope of this Article, 
since the public interest trademark cases have arisen under unique rules wherein a party 
claiming that it represents a portion of the public that find a term disparaging or scandalous has 
standing to object to registration of that term as a trademark.  Lanham Act §§ 2(a), 13, 14, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), 1063, 1064 (2013); Ritchie v. Simpson, 670 F.2d 1024, 1026-28 (C.C.P.A. 
1982). 
 7. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2113 
(2013) (holding that isolated gene sequences do not qualify for patent protection). 
 8. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (upholding the constitutionality of 
provision reinstating copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen into the 
public domain). 
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I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
A. Private and Public Rights 
Copyright law and patent law recognize that certain materials 
should qualify for private monopolies that allow the owner to exclude 
the public from unauthorized uses.  Patent law grants the patent owner 
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a protected 
invention.
9
  While patents protect inventions, copyrights grant 
monopolies in creative works, giving the proprietor the right, inter 
alia, to exclude others from copying a protected work.
10
 
In contrast to material protected by copyright and patent law, the 
public domain consists of the entire range of information available for 
use by anyone after setting aside those privileged uses of information 
for which some exclusive rights exist.
11
  Everyone may take material 
from the public domain and adapt it to create new material, thereby 
continuing the creative cycle through the mining, appropriation, and 
recombination of the creative fruits of the collective public.
12
 
The public domain encompasses material in two broad 
categories: material ineligible for protection and material whose term 
of protection has expired.  In the first category falls material not 
covered by an intellectual property right.  Material that does not meet 
the statutory requirements of usefulness, novelty, and non-
obviousness may not receive patent protection,
13
 nor may abstract 
ideas, facts, theorems, scientific principles, indispensable expressions, 
laws of nature, or natural phenomena.
14
  Copyright law protections do 
 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes . . . any patented 
invention . . . infringes the patent.”); Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2113 (2013) (recognizing 
exclusive rights that patents would confer on patentee to exclude others from isolating particular 
gene sequences and creating synthetic gene sequences); Sidney A. Diamond, The Public Interest 
and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 528, 532 (1980) (discussing the exclusive 
rights in patents). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2012) (setting forth the various creative works eligible for 
copyright protection, such as literary works, musical works, dramatic works, choreographic 
works, and the exclusive rights the owner holds in such works); Diamond, supra note 9, at 532 
(“A copyright proprietor can prevent anyone else from copying his work, either directly or in the 
form of a translation or adaptation.”). 
 11. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 362 (1999) (discussing permitted uses 
of information in the public domain). 
 12. Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meaning of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
215, 261-62 (2002) (“A property interest gives each member of the public an equal right to adapt 
and transform the material in question, thus promoting creativity.”). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 14. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (discussing exclusions from 
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not extend to facts, unoriginal material or elements, clichés, material 
indispensable to an idea’s expression, material not fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression, and ideas themselves.
15
  The second category 
includes material once protected by an intellectual property right, but 
no longer.  Patent and copyright terms expire after fixed periods; 
when those terms end the materials subject to intellectual property 
protection enter the public domain.
16
 
B. A Balancing of Rights and Incentives 
Patent law and copyright law share a common theoretical and 
Constitutional basis.  The Patents and Copyright Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution grants Congress the following authority: “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”17  This clause recognizes that information 
goods often carry high costs of production, but absent intellectual 
property rights, users may exploit and share that information quite 
cheaply.
18
  The utilitarian approach to patent and copyright law, 
acknowledged by the founders of the nation, Congress and the 
Supreme Court since the beginning of the Republic,
19
 suggests that 
 
patent protection); Ochoa, supra note 12, at 219 (discussing the multiple “public domains”); 
Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S 
L.R. 519, 543 (2000) (discussing scientific material that forms the public domain); Paul J. Heald 
and Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause 
as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1166 (2000) (noting various 
types of materials to which the public has always had free access). 
 15. Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 137, 
164-65 (1993) (stating that copyright protection does not extend to unoriginal material, material 
not fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and ideas not entitled to copyright protection); 
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (arguing that ideas are generally 
so important to the public that they must live in the public domain). 
 16. Ochoa, supra note 12, at 217 (“[A] large portion of the public domain consists of 
inventions and works that were formerly subject to patent and copyright protection, but are no 
longer.”). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 18. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (discussing the “public good” nature of intellectual 
property). 
 19. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The limited 
scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required 
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative 
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause 
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts.”); Precision 
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1944) (“A patent by its very 
nature is affected with a public interest.  As recognized by the Constitution, it is a special 
privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the Progress of Science and useful 
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granting a limited monopoly that gives creators the right to exclude 
users who do not pay for access to the work will encourage the 
creation of new material for the public to enjoy.
20
  Both the public and 
the creator benefit—the public from the new materials and the creator 
from the exclusive rights to commercial development and 
distribution.
21
  The production of new works serves the public benefit 
of furthering human knowledge and learning through the production 
of new material.
22
  While this monopoly exists the creator may sell 
the new material free from competition, helping to assure the 
recovery of the costs of production.
23
  The incentives in intellectual 
 
Arts.  At the same time, a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to 
the right to access to a free and open market.”); H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 7 (1909) (stating that 
copyright under the Constitution “is not based upon any natural rights that the author has in his 
writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served. . . . [T]he policy is 
believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and 
invention, to give some bonus to authors and inventors.”); Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with 
Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L.R. 366, 427 (2004) (“An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies 
of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times 
therein mentioned.”); Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 298-99 (1995) (stating that the first patent statute set forth a term 
of fourteen years—equivalent to the duration of two apprenticeships—to incentivize invention); 
James Iredell, Marcus IV, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J. (Mar. 1788), reprinted in 16 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 379, 382 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (arguing in favor of ratification of the Constitution, 
and pointing out that the Copyright Clause would “give birth to many excellent writings which 
would otherwise have never appeared”). 
 20. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013) (tying up the tools of innovation by granting patents to works of nature “would be at 
odds with the very point of patents, which exist to promote creation”); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. 
Ct. 873, 889 (2012) (“On the one hand, [a monopoly] can encourage production of new works. 
In the absence of copyright protection, anyone might freely copy the products of an author’s 
creative labor, appropriating the benefits without incurring the nonrepeatable costs of creation, 
thereby deterring authors from exerting themselves in the first place. That philosophy 
understands copyright’s grants of limited monopoly privileges to authors as private benefits that 
are conferred for a public reason—to elicit new creation.  The provision of incentives for the 
creation of new works is surely an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and 
learning.”); Landes and Posner, supra note 18, at 332 (stating that without copyright protection, 
“[t]here would be increased incentives to create faddish, ephemeral, and otherwise transitory 
works because the gains from being the first in the market for such works would be likely to 
exceed the losses from absence of copyright protection”). 
 21. Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The 
Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”). 
 22. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“Only inventions and discoveries 
which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of 
a limited private monopoly.”). 
 23. The Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
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property exclusive rights encourage the production of material that 
the public may enjoy and, when the materials enter the public domain, 
the public gains the benefit of unrestricted access to this material, 
with the freedom to adapt and recombine material from the public 
domain to create new works and inventions.
24
 
Justifications for copyright and patent protections most often rely 
on the utilitarian approach, but a natural rights theory sometimes 
provides a secondary basis for these bodies of law.
25
  This theory 
posits that the laborer has rights in the fruits of her labor.
26
  However, 
the grant of rights must comport with the “enough and as good” 
principle, according to which the author’s monopoly may not deprive 
the public of the right to enjoy the common heritage which the author 
mined to produce the new work.
27
 
James Madison opined that since the creation of new inventions 
benefits both the inventors and the public, “[t]he public good fully 
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.”28  However, 
achieving this balance can prove to be difficult.  Under the utilitarian 
approach, copyright and patent law must balance the individual’s 
incentive to create against the public’s desire for access to new 
information.
29
  The narrow tailoring of the intellectual property 
 
(characterizing “[t]he basic purpose of copyrights” as “[providing] a limited monopoly for 
authors primarily to encourage creativity”); Dallon, supra note 19, at 367-68 (stating that a 
monopoly provides an incentive to create works and facilitates the recovery of the costs of 
creation). 
 24. Wendy J. Gordon, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is 
Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 683 (2000) (“The public’s right is preserved in 
its ability to make use of the common heritage.”); Litman, supra note 15, at 965 (“One 
traditional justification for the public domain is that the public domain is the public’s price for 
the grant of a copyright.  The public is said to grant the copyright as an incentive to persuade the 
author to create and publish original works that will enrich the public domain.”). 
 25. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901-02 (acknowledging “natural rights” view as a basis for 
copyright protection); Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical Compositions; 
Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright Per Program Licenses: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 5 
(1997) (“The overarching premise of copyright law is that those who enrich our culture with the 
fruits of their intellect are no less entitled to be compensated than those who create more 
tangible products, be they skyscrapers or computers or five-star meals.”). 
 26. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyrights, 84 HARVARD L. REV. 281, 284 
(1970) (“The theory that authors have a natural right to the fruit of their labors is an ancient 
one.”). 
 27. Gordon, supra note 24, at 683; Litman, supra note 15, at 965 (“When individual 
authors claim that they are entitled to incentives that would impoverish the milieu in which other 
authors must also work, we must guard against protecting authors at the expense of the 
enterprise of authorship.”). 
 28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1941). 
 29. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (2012) (finding that in consideration of the need to grant to 
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protections should foment creative production without privatizing too 
much information or keeping it private for too long.
30
 
One may characterize this balancing as between public and 
private interests, as just discussed, or as between multiple public 
interests.  The public has an interest in enjoying free access to 
information—and therefore weak private rights.31  But the public also 
has an interest in the production of new information goods for it to 
enjoy and mine for the creation of even newer material, which it 
would want to protect with strong private rights.
32
  The public 
consists of individuals, all of whom have the potential to both create 
and consume new information goods and therefore seek equilibrium 
between these interests.
33
 
 
the creator exclusive rights to encourage the production of new material versus the potential 
costs for consumers arising from a monopoly, “the original British copyright statute, the 
Constitution’s Framers, and our case law all have recognized copyright’s resulting and 
necessary call for balance”); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the 
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 864 (1996) (“Patent and 
copyright law balance the incentive for innovation and expression against society’s interest in 
the efficient dissemination of inventions and expressive works.”). 
 30. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013) (stating that tying up the tools of innovation by granting patents to works of nature 
“would be at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to promote creation”); Stewart E. 
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1213 (1996) 
(“[C]opyright is justifiable only to the extent that copyright protection is necessary to induce 
additional creative activity.”); Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards 
for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 301 (1966) (“[A] patent should not be granted for an 
innovation unless the innovation would have been unlikely to have been developed absent the 
prospect of a patent.”). 
 31. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property 
and the Public Domain (Part II), 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 191, 266 (1994) (“This is the 
central problem in intellectual property law: privatizing information reduces competition and 
impedes widespread uses of such information.”). 
 32. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property 
and the Public Domain (Part I), 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 21 (1994) (“However, if social 
costs (less information consumption) from commodification start appearing to outweigh benefits 
of increased information production, the specter of the information-poor world arises again in a 
viciously circular fashion, pushing for the necessity of more incentives to produce more, and so 
on.”) (emphasis in original). 
 33. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2013) (observing that some 
holders of copyrights in books would approve of an effort to mass digitize those books, and 
therefore facilitate broader access to a larger number of works, while some opposed those efforts 
because of the loss of revenue from and control over their own works); Gordon, supra note 24, 
at 683 (“In short, the authors’ rights perspective ends up saying that the copyright statute must, 
to some extent, serve the public interest, which includes the interest of future creators, as well as 
the public.”). 
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C. The Anti-Enclosure Movement 
In recent years, critics of a perceived expansion of intellectual 
property rights have grown more vocal.
34
  This camp declares a crisis: 
“[T]here are too many IP rights; they are too strong; ‘something’ has 
to be done.”35  These criticisms perceive multiple attacks on the 
baseline of a strong public domain and limited exclusive rights.
36
  
Material formerly believed to belong in the commons has now 
become privatized and subject to new or expanded property rights.
37
  
For copyrights, critics have focused on term extensions.
38
  The 
criticism against expansion of rights in the field of patents has 
focused on the granting of patents for “ideas,” such as business 
methods and algorithms.
39
  The criticisms extend to patent rights for 
scientific knowledge, research tools, and, in particular, biological 
materials like DNA gene sequences.
40
  Such genetic materials form 
the “common heritage of humankind” and subjecting these materials 
to private property rights introduces market forces which may have 
disastrous consequences.
41
 
To this anti-enclosure camp, the expansions suggest that the field 
of intellectual property has come to over-emphasize the “property” 
aspect of the rights, thereby encouraging a desire to “own” and to 
privatize as much material as possible.
42
  This trend has resulted in a 
race to claim intellectual property protections as broadly and as 
 
 34. E.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38 (2003) (citations omitted) (noting the 
“remarkable” expansion of intellectual property rights and that the limits on those rights are 
“under attack”). 
 35. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 
183, 183 (2004). 
 36. Boyle, supra note 34, at 39 (citations omitted) (lamenting the removal of facts and 
ideas from the public domain); Aoki, supra note 32, at 6-7 (“These trends have increasingly 
turned elements of what had heretofore been considered common culture, ideas and information 
into forms of private intellectual property.”). 
 37. Boyle, supra note 34, at 37 (discussing the expansion of rights). 
 38. Gordon, supra note 24, at 676-77 (“[A]n instrumentalist is likely to doubt that 
incentives will be significantly enhanced by the extra twenty years of copyright term.”). 
 39. Boyle, supra note 34, at 38 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing business methods 
patents); Kane, supra note 14, at 521-22 (discussing patents in algorithms). 
 40. Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. 
REV. 707, 725 (2004) (stating that such commodification leads to debates on “the economic 
valuation of living materials”). 
 41. Boyle, supra note 34, at 37 (2003) (holding that the human genome “should not and 
perhaps in some sense cannot be owned”). 
 42. Benkler, supra note 11, at 355 (discussing propertization). 
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quickly as possible.
43
 
Even if the rights expansion resulted in increased production of 
new material (a point in dispute), the broader rights might impose far 
greater social costs in the form of restricted circulation and 
diminished competition.
44
  The public suffers more restrictions on the 
use of existing works, which remain under private ownership outside 
the public domain for longer.
45
  Production of new information 
becomes more expensive or impracticable because of the increased 
number of fragments of existing information subject to private rights, 
which carry license fees, and the challenges in locating the rights 
owners for material created decades earlier.
46
  The author or inventor 
faces a paradox because he wants strong rights for his own works, but 
weak rights for the material from which he borrows to create the new 
material.
47
  Noting that something must be done, some critics have 
turned to the courts. 
 
 43. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998) (“[N]obody wants to be 
the last one left dedicating findings to the public domain . . . .”). 
 44. Merges, supra note 35, at 199 (stating that society benefits from stronger rights only 
if the assets created as a result of those rights outweigh the overall costs); Yochai Benkler, Siren 
Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 103 (2001) 
(“[I]ncreases in the scope and reach of property rights benefit commercial producers who sell 
information goods . . . .”); Jane Ginsburg, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: 
How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651,698 (2000) (reasoning that 
changing the term length probably has little incremental value to most authors). 
 45. Megan M. La Belle, Standing to Sue in the Myriad Genetics Case, 2 CAL. L. REV. 
CIR. 68, 85 (2011) (“[W]hen private parties invalidate bad patents the public as a whole benefits 
from robust competition, increased consumer choice, and lower prices.”); Heller & Eisenberg, 
supra note 43, at 698 (describing the “tragedy of the anticommons”—that is, an underuse of a 
resource resulting from the private rights that exclude uses by others); Melville B. Nimmer, 
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of Free Speech and the Press?, 17 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1194-95 (1970) (questioning the benefits of stronger copyright 
protections). 
 46. Kane, supra note 40, at 719 (noting the chilling effect of expanded patent rights on 
downstream genetic research); Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 343 (“Every potential 
increase of protection, however, also raises the costs of, or reduces access to, the raw material 
from which you might have built those products.”); Breyer, supra note 26, at 326 (highlighting 
difficulties in locating rights holders). 
 47. Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 335 (“Some copyright protection is necessary to 
generate the incentives to incur the costs of creating easily copied works, but too much 
protection can raise the costs of creation for subsequent authors to the point where those authors 
cannot cover them even though they have complete copyright protection for their own 
originality.”). 
JACOBS 4/27/2014  7:36 PM 
2014] IN PRIVITY WITH THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 427 
II. STANDING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
A. The Doctrine of Standing 
Before the courts will consider the merits of any case, including 
public interest intellectual property cases, the plaintiffs may have to 
withstand challenges that they do not have the right to bring the 
lawsuit.  The doctrine of “standing” limits the types of disputes that a 
federal court has the authority to consider.  Under Article III of the 
Constitution, the federal courts may only decide “cases” or 
“controversies.”48  The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a three-part 
test to determine if a litigant has alleged a “case” or “controversy.”  
First, the plaintiff must allege that it suffered an “injury in fact—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized; and (b) actual and imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”49  Second, a causal connection must exist between the 
injury and the challenged action.
50
  Third, the plaintiff’s requested 
relief must redress the injury.
51
  Even if a matter passes this three-
element test, a federal court may decline to grant standing based on 
prudential concerns, such as when a litigant asserts the rights of third 
parties or raises general social grievances.
52
 
The standing doctrine serves multiple purposes.
53
  First, the 
doctrine ensures true adversity between the litigants, each with a stake 
in winning.
54
  Second, such litigants have an incentive to effectively 
 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Cases . . . [and] 
Controversies.”); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (“Federal courts have 
authority under the Constitution to answer such questions only if necessary to do so in the 
course of deciding an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”). 
 49. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations and 
punctuation omitted); accord Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2659 (“That party must also have ‘standing,’ 
which requires, among other things, that it have suffered a ‘concrete and particularized 
injury.’”). 
 50. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (holding that the litigant must establish a “fairly traceable” 
causation between the injury and the conduct). 
 51. Id. (requiring that requested relief appear likely to redress the injury); Gene R. Nichol 
Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308 (2002) 
(“The articulated Article III injury standard thus demands concrete and individualized harm, 
assuring that actual, consequential benefit accrues to the plaintiff from a favorable decision.”). 
 52. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2662 (“We have repeatedly held that such a ‘generalized 
grievance,’ no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.”); William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222-23 (1988) (“If a plaintiff can show sufficient injury 
to satisfy Article III, he must also satisfy prudential concerns about, for example, whether he 
should be able to assert the rights of someone else, or whether he should be able to litigate 
generalized social grievances.”). 
 53. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 222 (setting forth purposes of standing). 
 54. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 461, 469 (2008) 
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advocate their positions and sharpen the issues before the court.
55
  
Third, the people most concerned with the outcome of the dispute will 
have the opportunity to litigate the questions at issue.
56
  Fourth, the 
presentation of a concrete case by parties with an actual stake in the 
litigation informs the court of the practical consequences of its 
decision.
57
  Fifth, confining the court’s jurisdiction to “concrete and 
particularized” disputes prevents the anti-majoritarian federal courts 
from taking over the policy-making role of the popularly elected 
executive and legislative branches.
58
  Sixth, the standing doctrine 
allocates the scarce resources of the federal courts to disputes between 
parties who have a real stake in the matter.
59
 
These general standing rules apply to intellectual property cases 
as well.  In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., not a public-interest 
case, but rather a more traditional two-party dispute, the Supreme 
Court provided guidance on the standards of the standing doctrine 
specifically applicable to cases seeking a declaratory judgment 
 
(“A dispute that satisfies Article III thus has at least two sides, each of which has a stake in 
winning, and the doctrine of standing ensures that the plaintiff has such a stake.”). 
 55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (finding that “the gist of the question of 
standing” is whether “the appellants [have] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon 
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”). 
 56. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 310 (1979) 
(“The case or controversy requirement guarantees that the individuals most affected by the 
challenged activity will have a role in the challenge.  This guarantee should be seen as a 
minimal element of the legitimacy of a legal system which imposes legal burdens upon its 
members.  At some point in the legal process the affected individuals should have their day in 
court.”). 
 57. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (holding that the standing doctrine “tends to assure that the legal 
questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating 
society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the 
consequences of judicial action”); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VIR. L. 
REV. 1663, 1672 (2007) (“The ‘abstract’ injury shunned by standing doctrine may lead to an 
‘abstract’ presentation of the issues involved, while courts are better suited to make incremental, 
fact-specific determinations.”). 
 58. Elliott, supra note 54, at 462 (“Cases are sorted on a rough democratic theory: if an 
injury is shared by a large group of people, some cases suggest, such a group can and should 
take its problem to the legislature or the executive branch, not the courts.”); Fletcher, supra note 
52, at 222 (1988) (“The purposes include  . . .  preventing the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary 
from usurping the policy-making functions of the popularly elected branches.”). 
 59. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) (“Standing 
doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts 
are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.”); Antonin Scalia, The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 881, 891 (1983) (“Standing, in other words, is only meant to assure that the courts can do 
their work well, and not to assure that they keep out of affairs better left to the other branches.”). 
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regarding the scope of rights in a patent: “whether the facts alleged, 
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment.”60  
The public interest cases discussed in this article follow this 
standing regime, and application of the standing rules in these 
circumstances yields the three consequences of the private capture of 
public interests, binary tendency, and the finality tendency.  Applying 
the MedImmune test in Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO, the Supreme Court upheld the standing of one of the 
plaintiffs who challenged the validity of the two patents for the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences on the basis that no isolated 
gene sequences should qualify for patent protection.
61
  Doctor Ostrer 
contended that he would conduct testing on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
gene sequences, except that Myriad Genetics, the patent owner, 
threatened legal action.
62
 
Emblematic of the binary tendency, the courts did not grant 
standing to any of the other twenty plaintiffs—cancer patients, 
doctors, genetics researchers, and medical organizations—because 
either they did not have immediate plans to undertake allegedly 
infringing activities (despite the declarations of two other researchers 
who said they would undertake the allegedly infringing testing but for 
Myriad’s general threats) or Myriad had not threatened legal action 
against them specifically.
63
  The remaining parties in the litigation 
engaged in the private capture of public interests, fighting for control 
of the genetic material, with the Supreme Court ultimately 
invalidating patents in the naturally occurring genetic sequences, but 
upholding patents in synthetic gene sequences and diagnostic 
testing.
64
 
Standing has worked out unevenly in other recent public interest 
intellectual property cases.  In Organic Seed Growers and Trade 
 
 60. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (finding that a patent 
licensee has standing to challenge the validity of the patent even without stopping payment of 
the license fee). 
 61. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 
(2013) (recognizing right that patent, if valid, would confer on patentee to exclude others from 
isolating particular gene sequences and creating synthetic gene sequences). 
 62. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 (2013). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the lower court that plaintiff organic farmers did not have 
standing to seek a declaratory judgment invalidating defendant’s seed 
patents.
65
  These farmers sought to invalidate defendant’s seed 
patents, but more broadly, all patents for transgenic seeds, on the 
basis that patenting transgenic seeds lead to effects “injurious to the 
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”66  Although the 
defendant had initiated a large number of suits against other farmers, 
those disputes differed factually from the one before the court; the 
Organic Seed plaintiffs did not intend to use the seeds in question and 
the defendant had publicly stated that it did not intend to sue farmers 
with trace amounts of seeds on their fields.
67
  Emblematic of the 
finality tendency, the court did not consider the substantive arguments 
and the other branches have not picked up the policy question. Had 
the court granted standing, the litigation would have determined who 
could exert control over the seeds, again pointing to the private 
capture of public interests. 
Similar challenges arose in a copyright case seeking invalidation 
of rights in an entire category of works.  In Aharonian v. Gonzales, a 
computer programmer challenged the constitutionality of copyright 
protection for software source code, attempting to exert a private 
capture of public interests by wresting the monopolies away from the 
source code copyright owners.
68
  The court concluded that the 
plaintiff had suffered an injury-in-fact, namely, that he had to pay 
license fees to use software source code protected by copyright.
69
  
Nonetheless, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim challenging the 
protection of “ideas” for lack of standing since the court viewed that 
claim as a generalized grievance.
70
  The court did not, however, view 
the claims of unconstitutional vagueness as generalized grievances, 
since the plaintiff merely sought a declaration that Congress had not 
properly defined the terms essential to apply the statute to software 
 
 65. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 718 F.3d 1350, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 66. First Amended Complaint at 2, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto 
Corp., No. 11-cv-2163-NRB (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011) (citation omitted). 
 67. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1352. 
 68. Aharonian v. Gonzales, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting motion to 
dismiss claims challenging the validity and scope of copyright protection in software source 
code). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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code.
71
  Although the court agreed that the plaintiff had standing to 
assert these claims, it dismissed them for failing to state a claim, 
pointing towards the finality tendency.
72
 
In two Supreme Court copyright cases seeking to undo broad 
protections, the plaintiffs had little to no problems demonstrating 
standing.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), 
which added twenty years to the terms of most copyrighted works.
73
  
The question of standing did not reach the Eldred Supreme Court, but 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded 
that the plaintiffs—individuals, corporations, and associations who 
depended on works in the public domain (including a book 
distributor, a book re-printer, a sheet music vendor, a choir director, 
and a film preservation and restoration company)—had standing to 
challenge the CTEA.
74
   
The plaintiffs benefit from using works in the public domain and, 
but for the CTEA, they would be able to exploit additional works 
the copyrights to which would have expired in the near future.  As 
such, they suffer an injury in fact that is traceable to the CTEA and 
that we could redress by holding the Act invalid.
75
 
The plaintiffs did not set forth any specific works whose 
copyright they would infringe but for the copyright extension affected 
by the statute.
76
 
In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which 
reinstated copyrights for certain foreign works whose terms had 
lapsed under current law.
77
  The Golan plaintiffs did not face any 
challenges to their standing.  Both cases demonstrate the binary 
 
 71. Id. (“The fact that finding copyright law unconstitutional would affect many people 
does not transform plaintiff’s claim into a generalized grievance, as standing depends only on 
whether plaintiff has alleged a concrete, particular harm.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 74. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (confirming standing for 
plaintiffs who might use works that would pass into the public domain but for the Copyright 
Term Extension Act), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 75. Id. at 375 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)) 
(standing not raised on appeal). 
 76. See Second Amended Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, No. 1:99CV00065 (D.D.C. June 
24, 1999); First Amended Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, No. 1:99CV00065 (D.D.C. May 10, 
1999); Complaint, No. 1:00CV00065 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1999) 1999 WL 33743484. 
 77. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (upholding the constitutionality of provision 
reinstating copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain). 
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tendency, in that the court decided a discrete question of how long 
these specific rights owners would retain their monopolies, instead of 
considering the question of copyright term length from the broader 
policy perspective of how to maximize the production of new material 
for the public to enjoy.  They also show attempts to displace the 
private capture of public interests from the copyright owners—who 
enjoy a monopoly—to the copyright users, who want to control that 
monopoly. 
B. The Challenge of Standing in Public Interest Intellectual 
Property Cases 
Having discussed how the courts applied the doctrine of standing 
to public interest intellectual property cases, this section now explores 
how these cases fit with the concept of “injury in fact” and the six 
purposes of Constitutionally required standing.
78
 
1. Injury-in-Fact 
Public interest intellectual property cases raise unique issues 
with respect to the requirement of suffering an injury-in-fact.  The 
plaintiffs bring these cases seeking to rein in what they view as 
excessive protections implicating broad categories of material.  Yet, a 
concern for the integrity of the public domain does not equate to a 
traditionally recognized, concrete injury suffered uniquely by the 
plaintiff.  The Supreme Court recently made clear that to meet the 
standing threshold, “it is not enough that the party invoking the power 
of the court have a keen interest in the issue,” when it denied standing 
to backers of an initiative passed by the voters of California, but 
which the state government declined to defend.
79
  When a law creates 
a general obligation to the public, individuals do not hold the private 
right to enforce that law.
80
  Unlike some other constitutional 
provisions, the Patent and Copyright Clause does not confer a private 
right of action on individuals.
81
  Nor does the Copyright Act or Patent 
 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 79. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (rejecting standing of parties 
challenging same-sex marriage in California when state officials declined to defend law that 
would have banned such marriages). 
 80. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 210 (1992) (discussing private rights of actions); Scalia, supra 
note 59, at 895 (“That explains, I think, why ‘concrete injury’—an injury apart from the mere 
breach of the social contract, so to speak, effected by the very fact of unlawful government 
action—is the indispensable prerequisite of standing.”). 
 81. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 210 (contrasting the private rights under the fourth 
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Act confer a right for an individual to bring an action on behalf of the 
public domain.
82
 
The plaintiffs in Organic Seed Growers asserted injuries more 
properly characterized as generally applicable to the general public.  
At the heart of their case, they opposed transgenic seeds from a policy 
perspective because of the potential negative effects on the food 
supply.
83
  They did not use transgenic seeds themselves nor did they 
want transgenic seeds on their farms.
84
  As they did not claim any past 
or future interest in the protected material, they could not establish 
standing, and the court declined to consider the broader policy 
questions relating to transgenic seeds.
85
 
Both economic and non-economic injuries may satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement.
86
  Multiple cases acknowledge social 
costs, such as the economic effects of immigration regulations on jobs 
in a community and the loss of enjoyment of land as a result of the 
failure to enforce the Clean Water Act, as sufficient injuries to 
establish standing.
87
  The Court has also recognized standing resulting 
from “opportunity” harms—that is, the injury resulting when a 
government action or omission forecloses the opportunity to enjoy 
some benefit.
88
  In such cases, the litigant needs to characterize the 
 
Amendment recognized in Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971), 
with other constitutional provisions). 
 82. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2012) (making no allowance for private attorney general suits); 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101  (2012) (same). 
 83. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding no standing for seed growers despite active enforcement by the 
patentee), aff’d 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.  2013). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000) (recognizing 
standing for environmental advocacy organization alleging that members would suffer negative 
impacts to their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests from defendant’s mercury 
discharges); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court – a Functional Analysis, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 645, 675-76 (1973) (“[T]he proposition now seems firmly established that 
standing may stem from injury to noneconomic interests, such as aesthetic, conservational, 
recreational, or spiritual values.”). 
 87. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181 (recognizing standing based on citizens’ 
perceived decrease in the “aesthetic and recreational values of the area” affected by the 
challenged government action); Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93 F.3d. 897, 
900 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing standing for communities concerned about immigrants’ 
impact on availability of employment and impact on public services like hospitals and schools); 
Northwest Forest Workers Ass’n v. Lyng, 688 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 n.2 (D.D.C. 1988) (recognizing 
standing for workers concerned about guest worker program). 
 88. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 205 (noting the re-characterization of the injury in Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), from denial to the medical school 
based on race to denial to compete for all 100 spots in the class). 
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injury as an increased risk of harm, rather than in traditional cause-of-
action language, since the challenged government program generally 
targets broad sectors of the population and rarely will yield concrete 
harms particularized to any one person.
89
  Public interest intellectual 
property plaintiffs could characterize their injuries as opportunity 
harms.  Under this viewpoint, the actions of the government in favor 
of a private rights holder deprive the plaintiffs of the benefit of 
material which should belong in the public domain.
90
 
Additionally, the Court, at times, has recognized expressive 
harms—the harms resulting from a government action that conveys a 
social meaning inconsistent with the principles valued by society, 
rather than the material consequences of those actions—as injuries-in-
fact.
91
  Yet, the Court has also said that expressive harms do not per 
se confer standing on the claimant alleging injury.
92
  One may view 
injuries alleged in public interest intellectual property through the lens 
of expressive harms.  The anti-enclosure movement’s opposition to 
what its adherents characterize as increased propertization of 
copyrights and patents and the shrinking of the public domain forms 
the theoretical basis for many of the copyright and patent cases.
93
  The 
plaintiffs would argue that these government actions stand opposed to 
the nation’s values of freedom and a robust commons which enables 
the civic discourse that fuels our democracy. 
Yet, public interest intellectual property plaintiffs do not need to 
resort to these characterizations in order to establish standing.  These 
 
 89. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 206-07 (citing, as an example, withholding federal funding 
from projects that threaten endangered species or that discriminate on the basis of race). 
 90. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302, 1320 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(alleging injury resulting from inability to conduct or benefit from research and to obtain 
diagnostic tests, and the high fees charged by the patentee), aff’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. 
Ct. 873 (2012) (reviewing plaintiffs’ complaint of required license fees for use of the works and 
the inability to find the rights holders which would preclude their use of the works); Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (reviewing the same). 
 91. Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 
395-96 (2004) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 640 (1993)) (recognizing standing to challenge 
racial gerrymandering claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 92. Id. at 395-96 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)) (“[T]he stigmatizing 
injury often caused by racial discrimination . . . accords a basis for standing only to those 
persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.”). 
 93. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 
(2013) (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene sequences, challenged for propertizing 
natural material out of the public domain, but unanimously upholding the patentability of 
synthetically created complementary DNA); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (upholding the 
constitutionality of provision reinstating copyright protection for certain foreign works that had 
fallen in the public domain). 
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plaintiffs bring the lawsuits not only for ideological reasons, but 
because they suffer an economic injury.  The protections contested by 
the plaintiffs in cases like Myriad, Golan and Eldred, might result in 
harms experienced generally by the public—such as increased 
propertization—but also in harms experienced solely by a small 
number of individuals or entities, such as license fees, the lack of 
access to material held by an unwilling rights holder, the inability to 
conduct or benefit from research exploiting the patented material, and 
the inability to create or benefit from derivative works to be created 
from material now outside the public domain.
94
  When viewed from 
the perspective of such individuals or entities, these cases fit squarely 
within the traditional approach to articulating harm, and thus support 
the recognition of their standing to bring claims arising from these 
protections. 
It would seem appropriate to require the plaintiff to assert an 
interest in a particular protected work, even if the plaintiff’s claimed 
injury arises not from rights unique to that work, but rather to broadly 
applicable rights.  Yet the courts did not require that the Eldred or 
Golan plaintiffs identify a specific copyrighted work which they 
sought to invalidate.
95
  In Eldred, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia observed in a footnote that “[u]nless the Plaintiffs’ 
allegation that they prepared to use these works in some way is 
untrue, the Plaintiffs have constitutional standing as the enactment of 
the CTEA allegedly caused an injury in fact to their ability to use 
these works that is redressable by declaratory judgment.”96  
Accordingly, in the copyright cases the courts have concerned 
themselves more with the aggregate impact of the challenged 
legislation, rather than the injury to each of the plaintiffs. 
On the other hand, the patent cases examine each plaintiff’s 
standing individually, rather than based on the harms suffered by the 
plaintiffs in the aggregate.
97
  Under this approach, threats by the 
 
 94. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7 (reviewing plaintiffs’ alleged 
inability to conduct or benefit from research and to obtain diagnostic tests, and the high fees 
charged by the patentee); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873 (addressing plaintiffs’ complaint of the 
license fees for use of the works and the inability to find the rights holders which would 
preclude their use of the works); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (addressing the same). 
 95. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating 
copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen in the public domain); Eldred, 537 
U.S. at 218 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 96. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 n.3 (1999) (upholding Copyright Term Extension 
Act), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 97. Compare Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7  (finding standing for 
one plaintiff who had received a demand letter, but no standing for other plaintiffs who had not 
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patentee against third parties do not establish standing, even if the 
plaintiff would undertake the activities but for the patentee’s history 
of enforcement.
98
  The patent plaintiffs had difficulty establishing 
standing because, for the most part, they had not used the patented 
inventions challenged in the litigation.  In contrast, the copyright 
plaintiffs alleged that they currently use or have already used the 
works subject to the statute.
99
 
2. True Adversity 
The doctrine of standing furthers a fundamental purpose of 
ensuring true adversity between the litigants, each with a stake in 
winning.
100
  In the public interest IP cases, true adversity depends on 
how you define the injury.  In the clear case, an individual or entity 
has standing when the rights holder has threatened it with litigation 
for using the ostensibly protected material.
101
  The party threatened 
with litigation has a stake in winning the case—a favorable decision 
by the court would result in the ability to exploit the material without 
the need to pay a license fee.  Courts may not even require a threat of 
litigation, instead accepting the continuation of activity deemed 
infringing under the law as sufficient to establish the stake in winning, 
as in Golan and Eldred.
102
  Without either a threat of litigation or 
current infringing activity, a potential litigant will face difficulties 
establishing standing.  For example, the patients in Myriad who 
would benefit from broader research on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes, or concert goers who want to enjoy music pulled back from the 
 
received such letters), with Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (finding standing for a large number of 
plaintiffs to challenge Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 98. Compare Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7 (finding standing for 
one plaintiff who had received a demand letter, but no standing for other plaintiffs who had not 
received such letters) with Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 2012-
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding no standing for seed growers despite active enforcement by the 
patentee). 
 99. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating 
copyrights for certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 
193 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 100. Elliott, supra note 54, at 469 (“A dispute that satisfies Article III thus has at least two 
sides, each of which has a stake in winning, and the doctrine of standing ensures that the 
plaintiff has such a stake.”). 
 101. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7 (finding standing for one 
plaintiff who had received a demand letter, but no standing for other plaintiffs who had not 
received such letters). 
 102. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating 
copyrights for certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 
193 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act). 
JACOBS 4/27/2014  7:36 PM 
2014] IN PRIVITY WITH THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 437 
public domain after Golan, had a stake in knocking down the 
extension of rights.  However, because these downstream users did 
not exploit the material directly, but rather consumed the fruits of 
someone else’s (infringing) use, that alleged direct infringer had more 
of a stake in winning the litigation.
103
 
When a court confers standing on a plaintiff, the court 
recognizes that the party has true adversity with respect to the 
property right in question.  Through the litigation they intend to 
reduce or eliminate the costs for them to exploit the material covered 
by the intellectual property protection.  This position thus serves to 
propertize the plaintiffs’ stance to the intellectual property, feeding 
the trend of propertization criticized by those supporting the 
plaintiff’s lawsuits against the broad property interests.  Evidencing 
the private capture of public interests, the case becomes a property 
dispute—a winner-takes-all fight to keep exclusive rights or open up 
the material for free use by all.  Per the binary tendency, this form of 
adjudication does not allow for deliberative policy-making involving 
inputs from multiple constituencies with the end goal of producing 
policies that enhance the welfare of the general public, policies that 
balance the incentives to the inventors and authors to produce with 
the public’s ease of accessing the fruits of production. 
Conceiving of “true adversity” from the perspective of the 
plaintiff alone does not address the other side of the dispute.  An 
inadequacy of adversity may arise when the defendant does not have 
sufficient interest in winning the dispute or does not represent all of 
the interests adverse to those of the plaintiff.  The only question the 
standing doctrine poses regarding defendants is whether a decision 
against the defendants would redress the injury asserted by the 
plaintiff, and not whether the litigation includes the most impacted 
stakeholders.
104
  Public interest plaintiffs commonly sue an agent of 
the executive branch of the federal government, such as the Attorney 
General (Eldred and Golan) or the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) (Myriad).
105
  These defendants have the 
authority to provide relief that will redress the injury, since a decision 
 
 103. See Nichol, supra note 51, at 323 (“A lot of things hurt, in one way or another.  
Sometimes the harms are subjective, or regarded as such.  If, however, a lot of us seem to feel 
the same way, the injury moves anomalously, closer to an ‘objective’ reality.”). 
 104. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (requiring that requested relief 
appear likely to redress the injury). 
 105. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(naming USPTO as defendant); Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (naming Attorney General as defendant); 
Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (naming Attorney General as defendant). 
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against the Attorney General would result in invalidation of the 
copyright statutes and a decision against the USPTO would invalidate 
a patent registration.  The government may also have an interest in 
assuring the proper execution of the law.  However, the government 
does not have any particular interest in the specific protected material 
under consideration in the litigation.  In the copyright suits, the U.S. 
Attorney General, as the sole defendant, protects the expanded rights 
of private owners.
106
  This role of the government as a defendant in a 
binary dispute causes it to neglect its responsibility to represent the 
entirety of the public interest, not just the interests held by the rights 
holder or those advocating for the public domain.  Accordingly, for 
true adversity, the government should not substitute for the rights 
holder. 
While rights holders could seek to intervene in cases as 
interested parties, they may not know that the litigation exists, that a 
case seeking to reduce the term of copyrights has an impact on their 
specific copyrights, or that a case seeking to invalidate patents 
relating specifically to cancer genes would have an impact on other 
gene patents.
107
  Even if all of the affected rights holders joined the 
litigation, other interests would remain unrepresented—consumers 
concerned about the price and supply of new material, patients 
wanting access to new medical research, and competitors who want to 
limit the scope of protection for the rights holder without imposing a 
future restriction on the scope of their own rights.  Representation of 
all of these interests in the litigation would not guarantee effective 
representation, either. 
Under this landscape, plaintiffs may strategically choose which 
defendants to sue—for example, an underfunded rights holder who 
will have difficulty defending the action—and obtain a broad decision 
with implications beyond that individual rights holder. 
3. Effective Representation 
Truly adverse litigants with a stake in winning have incentives to 
advocate their positions.
108
  Effective advocacy helps to sharpen the 
 
 106. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873  (reviewing Attorney General’s defense of the expanded 
copyright protections); Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (same). 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (allowing for permissive joinder of anyone who “has a claim or 
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact”). 
 108. Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1706 (1980) (“The basic constitutional requirement enunciated by the 
Court is that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the action sufficient to ensure a concrete and 
adversarial presentation.  This requirement is phrased as a means to an end: the personal stake is 
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issues before the court; parties with a stake in the litigation have an 
incentive to do the research and prepare the arguments for the 
court.
109
  A litigant who has not suffered the principal injury, or who 
asserts rights on behalf of a non-party, may nonetheless effectively 
advocate the matter; indeed, it has suffered a significant enough 
injury to motivate it to come to court.
110
  The fact that a party has 
chosen to devote money and other resources to a dispute by initiating 
litigation seems to indicate that such party has sufficiently invested in 
the matter to present an effective case.
111
  An organization with no 
personal stake in a case may offer more effective advocacy than a 
person with clear standing.
112
  For example, a trade association could 
advocate more effectively for the interests of its members than any of 
the resource-constrained members could on its own.
113
  Nonetheless, 
effective advocacy does not per se create a case or controversy.
114
 
The connection between direct adversity and effectiveness of 
representation has played out unevenly in public interest intellectual 
property cases.  As the theory goes, individuals who suffer a direct 
injury would advocate more vigorously than those less directly 
impacted by the challenged action.  However, the public interest 
 
required in that it ensures concrete adversity.”). 
 109. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 73, 87 (2007) (“In 
our adversarial system of justice, courts rely on parties to do the work of researching issues and 
making the best possible arguments for each side so that the court can reach a sound decision.  
Therefore, according to this argument, it is essential that each party have a stake in the litigation 
that gives it the incentive to do the necessary work.”). 
 110. Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party 
Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 406, 454 (1981) (“I 
recommend that courts permit litigants to assert the rights of third parties so long as the litigant 
appears reasonably likely to represent the interests of those third parties adequately.”). 
 111. Siegel, supra note 109, at 89 (“If, as standing doctrine posits, a dollar’s worth of 
injury sufficiently motivates plaintiffs to litigate vigorously, it would seem equally likely that 
courts would receive vigorous litigation from any party who takes the trouble to sue and who 
cares enough to pay the litigation costs.”). 
 112. Id. at 88 (“Even accepting the notion that the standing and mootness requirements 
guarantee that parties will have a ‘stake’ in litigation, there is no necessary link between having 
such a stake and litigating with the vigor to illuminate issues properly for the court.  A litigant 
with a significant stake in litigation may present poor arguments (perhaps because the litigant 
has inferior counsel); a non-Hohfeldian litigant may have all the resources of a national 
advocacy group behind her.”). 
 113. Kelsey M. Heilman, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations’ 
Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 237, 251-52 (2008) (citing Hunt v. Wash. 
State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1977)) (discussing benefits of 
associational standing). 
 114. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (“No matter how deeply 
committed petitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8 or how ‘zealous their advocacy,’ that 
is not a ‘particularized interest’ sufficient to create a case or controversy under Article III.”). 
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intellectual property cases litigated thus far do not permit testing of 
this hypothesis.  First, the small sample size (perhaps a dozen cases) 
would not yield any statistically significant conclusions.  Second, 
public interest advocacy groups like the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, the ACLU, and Public Patent and prominent intellectual 
property scholars like Lawrence Lessig have backed all of the 
Supreme Court cases identified in this Article,
115
 meaning that all of 
the cases have involved ideological plaintiffs; the cases do not include 
examples filed solely by non-ideological plaintiffs for comparison. 
Third, the inconsistency in outcomes suggests that the type of 
plaintiff does not correlate with the vigor of the advocacy or the 
success on the merits.  The copyright cases of Golan and Eldred 
featured ideological plaintiffs deeply concerned about the 
encroachment on the public domain threatened by copyright term 
extensions, as well as individuals who faced direct economic injury 
because they would have to pay more royalties or forego using certain 
works and risk smaller audiences.
116
  Plaintiffs in both cases included 
a wide range of parties who demonstrated an array of real impacts of 
the challenged statutes, and boasted impressive counsel.
117
  Their lack 
of success on the merits does not mean that they lacked a direct stake 
in the matter or effective representation, merely that they did not 
convince the courts that the challenged statutes failed constitutional 
review.  On the other hand, plaintiffs in patent disputes have 
experienced more difficulties with standing.
118
  Yet even when only 
one of twenty plaintiffs survived the standing challenge, the plaintiff 
side convinced the Supreme Court to issue a sweeping decision 
 
 115. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110 (2013) 
(Public Patent Foundation represented petitioners); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877 (2012) 
(Stanford Law School programs represented petitioners); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 
(2003) (Lessig argued on behalf of petitioners); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 
F. Supp. 2d 181, 183 (2010) (ACLU represented petitioners); Golan v. Holder, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/cases/golan-v-holder (last visited March 28, 2014) 
(EFF submitted amicus brief in Golan). 
 116. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (hearing plaintiffs’ concern about the 
expansion of copyright and also faced increased fees to conduct their businesses); Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (hearing the same). 
 117. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating 
copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen in the public domain); Eldred, 537 
U.S. at 222 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 118. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene sequences for the only plaintiff out of twenty 
to survive the standing challenge); Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 
718 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of standing). 
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unanimously invalidating patents in gene sequences.
119
  Thus, the 
cases in this field do not suggest that directness of adversity has any 
correlation to effectiveness of representation. 
4. Most Direct Stake 
Standing limits access to the courthouse so that those most 
concerned with resolution of the dispute will have the opportunity to 
direct the litigation.
120
  The Supreme Court recently denied standing 
to individuals who had sponsored a California ballot initiative, which 
the federal district court found unconstitutional and the state 
government declined to appeal.
121
  The Court held that “[t]hey have 
no ‘personal stake’ in defending its enforcement that is 
distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of 
California.”122  Going further, the Court declared that “Article III 
standing ‘is not to be placed in the hands of concerned bystanders, 
who will use it simply as a vehicle for the vindication of value 
interests.’”123 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the outcome of litigation on 
the issue may bind non-litigants who have a direct stake in the matter, 
perhaps even a greater interest than those who brought the case to the 
court.
124
  Considering the binding effect of litigation on not just the 
parties, but on all those with an interest in analogous intellectual 
property, the directness of impact thus should play a major role in the 
determination of “true adversity.”  While the direct and downstream 
users share aligned interests in the instant goal of achieving access to 
the rights, their broader goals might diverge.
125
 
For instance, researchers might craft the requested relief 
 
 119. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107 (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene 
sequences). 
 120. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) (“[T]he courts should not adjudicate 
such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish 
to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is 
successful or not.”). 
 121. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 122. Id. at 2656. 
 123. Id. at 2663 (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)). 
 124. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1693 (recognizing the need to protect individuals’ 
choices about the exercise of their rights). 
 125. See Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (“Isn’t there a danger that by seeking to 
change the law too rapidly an ideological plaintiff will take greater risks by framing the issues in 
a broader, more controversial, manner? . . . The danger is that without a real client, and without 
a sense of accountability to an identifiable individual, their capacity truly to represent the public 
interest would be diminished.”). 
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narrowly so that a court decision would not limit their ability to seek 
protection for their own innovations, while patients might seek 
broader relief so that they would have unrestrained access to all 
downstream research.  Likewise, the artists who would perform the 
works pulled back from the public domain, or mine those works to 
create derivative works, might seek to keep original works in the 
public domain, but retain robust protections for their new works 
utilizing elements from those works.  Meanwhile, consumers making 
individual purchases of the new works may prefer to keep all of the 
works in the public domain, believing that free access to the works 
would keep prices down.  These consumers also have the least 
invested in the matter since they may choose to purchase other goods, 
and therefore may not stick with the litigation to the end or devote 
sufficient resources to advocate for their position.  These various 
interests and viewpoints attest to the multiple competing public 
interests which all inform the question of balancing the desire for a 
large and free public domain versus the need for incentives in the 
form of private, exclusive rights to feed that public domain. 
Litigants face this challenge in all areas of law, since prior 
litigation may set precedent adverse to future parties.  When 
confronted with seemingly adverse case law, plaintiffs may attempt to 
argue that the dissimilarities in facts should lead to different results.  
The particular dynamics of public interest intellectual property cases 
may make such an approach less feasible.  In these cases, the initial 
plaintiffs may take an all-in approach, challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute (such as in Eldred)
126
 or the propriety of 
protection for entire classes of material (such as in Myriad).
127
  If the 
court has already decided the questions of broad applicability and 
invalidated protections that extend to future litigants as well, the 
factual differences in cases future litigants might bring make no 
difference—someone else has taken their opportunity to present the 
case to the court. 
To ensure that both the issues presented to the court and the 
sought-after relief match the real, present-day state of affairs 
implicated by the complained-of actions, the standing doctrine 
 
 126. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of 
Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 127. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 
(2013) (affirming plaintiff’s challenge to patent protection for human gene sequences but 
unanimously upholding the patentability of synthetically created complementary DNA). 
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requires that the litigants live with the outcome of the litigation.
128
  
However, to meet the standing threshold, a litigant need only establish 
it has suffered an injury in fact, and meeting that threshold does not 
necessarily mean that the litigant will have the most direct stake, the 
most representative case, or the most effective representation.
129
  One 
broad view of standing goes so far as to argue that the public should 
have standing to bring claims when a government action expresses “a 
constitutionally impermissible conception of national political 
identity.”130 
Such a reading would seem to encompass standing for both 
patients seeking access to patented cancer diagnostic tests, as with the 
patients in Myriad, and anyone else arguing that some grant of rights 
interfered with society’s understanding of the balancing of interests in 
intellectual property.
131
  The Court denied the Myriad patients 
standing and, thus, the opportunity to have their viewpoints 
considered (consistent with the binary tendency reducing a matter 
important to multiple stakeholders to a two-party dispute).  While 
these constituents should have the opportunity to influence the policy 
decision, they do not have as direct an interest in the dispute as others 
(such as the researchers wanting to conduct testing with the gene 
sequences).  Viewed this way, it seems appropriate to deny standing 
to the patients in favor of the researchers. 
The courts could deny standing to a potential litigant, even if it 
suffered a direct injury, if that individual or entity would not provide 
adequate representation for others who also suffered direct injury.
132
  
For class actions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires that the 
federal courts consider whether the proposed representative plaintiff 
 
 128. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 310 (“In fact, one of the best explanations of the case or 
controversy requirement may be the desire of courts to ensure the accountability of 
representatives. . . . The case or controversy requirement guarantees that the individuals most 
affected by the challenged activity will have a role in the challenge.  This guarantee should be 
seen as a minimal element of the legitimacy of a legal system which imposes legal burdens upon 
its members.  At some point in the legal process the affected individuals should have their day in 
court.”). 
 129. Siegel, supra note 109, at 92 (“Even taking the standing requirement for all it is 
worth, it requires only that a plaintiff challenging governmental activity show some injury, 
perhaps a trifling injury, from the challenged activity.  It does not require that a suit be brought 
by the most affected plaintiff.”). 
 130. Cox, supra note 91, at 396-97 (setting forth a view of standing based on “expressive 
harms” rather than “injury in fact”). 
 131. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107 (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene 
sequences; only one plaintiff, a researcher, survived the standing challenge). 
 132. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309 (arguing that the courts should not assume that “self-
appointed ideological plaintiffs” will always provide adequate representation). 
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has claims typical of the class and will adequately represent the 
interests of the entire class.
133
  In public interest intellectual property 
litigation, the court could conduct analysis similar to that applied to 
representativeness inquiries in class action certification—assessing 
the litigant’s character, the proximity in interests between the litigant 
and the absentees, and the abilities of counsel.
134
 
Yet, to require the courts to determine whether a plaintiff in a 
public interest intellectual property case will adequately represent 
those similarly situated creates significant complexities and 
burdens.
135
  In public interest intellectual property cases, the courts do 
not know the full universe of stakeholders, especially when the 
plaintiffs do not bring the cases as class actions.  Myriad presented a 
unique scenario in which the court could choose the most directly 
impacted plaintiff from a gallery of differently affected litigants.
136
  
The court does not usually have that visibility.  In the normal case, 
courts cannot assess the typicality of the claims of the plaintiff or its 
capacity to adequately represent the interests of those similarly 
situated when the suit does not include any significant number of 
other stakeholders. 
A court could require the joinder of those absent individuals or 
entities whose rights the litigation would impact.
137
  Under this 
approach, the original plaintiff would now face the daunting task of 
navigating a complex and massive multi-party litigation.  Only well-
resourced parties will choose to proceed.  The self-selection of 
 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 134. Rohr, supra note 110, at 455-564 (“In determining the likely adequacy of the 
representation of a class within the meaning of rule 23, courts have considered the personal 
character of the representative, his interest in the litigation, and the competence and experience 
of his counsel.  Generally, courts may appropriately consider these factors in the context of 
third-party standing as well.”); Scott, supra note 86, at 680 (“This [representativeness] inquiry 
would focus not only on whether the plaintiff is able and likely to present a technically adequate 
case, but also on whether his interest is sufficiently representative of that of other persons 
affected by the government’s actions that the relief sought by him will adequately protect them 
as well.”). 
 135. Scott, supra note 86, at 680-81 (“To evaluate which persons or organizations are most 
representative of the interests of all those affected by the challenged government action is a task 
for which courts have no suitable tools.”). 
 136. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107 (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene 
sequences and finding standing for only one plaintiff, a researcher). 
 137. Rohr, supra note 110, at 459 (“As the situation typified by this case would fall within 
the ambit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, the court should bring the third party into the 
lawsuit when jurisdictionally feasible.  If the court then determines that a conflict of interest 
exists between the litigant and the third party, it can dismiss the suit for lack of third-party 
standing . . . .”). 
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litigants makes them more invested in the litigation, but does not 
necessarily yield a sample representative of the entirety of interests 
impacted by the policy.  Given the large number of stakeholders (e.g., 
consumers, competitors) in these types of cases, mandatory joinder 
would prove impracticable for the parties and court. 
Even without mandatory joinder, litigation brought by 
ideological plaintiff classes may efficiently showcase a wide range of 
stakeholder viewpoints caused by the challenged action.
138
  Moreover, 
ideological organizations bringing impact litigation seeking to 
advance the public interest tend to put forward a lead plaintiff with 
the most sympathetic facts.
139
  In cases of public interest impact 
litigation brought by an ideological plaintiff who leads a plaintiff 
class, an ideological organization that represents directly affected 
constituents, or an association representing similarly situated 
members, aggregating resources opens the courtroom to individuals 
who might not have access otherwise and creates efficiencies 
compared to bringing multiple individual suits.
140
  Well-resourced by 
an ideological backer, a public interest class of ideological plaintiffs 
may provide the most effective representation.
141
  Indeed, an 
organization with no direct, personal stake in a particular case may 
take more of an interest in that case—for ideological reasons—than a 
party suffering a direct injury.
142
 
 
 138. Tushnet, supra note 108, at 1713 (“[I]deological plaintiffs, who usually have a 
reasonably adequate commitment to continuing efforts, will do a better job of representing 
absentees than will Hohfeldian litigants.”). 
 139. Id. at 1713-14 (“[A] public interest litigant will rarely fail to present a sufficiently 
concrete case.  The lore of public interest litigation is replete with tales of trying to find the 
‘best’ plaintiff, that is, the one on whom the legal rule to be challenged operates in the most 
heart-rending way.”). 
 140. Heilman, supra note 113, at 251-52 (“Organizations have resources and expertise that 
their members lack. . . . In addition, individuals often face significant economic and other 
barriers to bringing suit in the adversarial system, especially when those individuals have 
limited resources or claims for only small damages.”); Ann M. Southworth, Collective 
Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM. 
L. REV. 2449, 2450 (1999) (“Aggregating claims sometimes increases access to the legal system 
for individuals who otherwise would be unable to find representation.  Achieving systemic 
change benefiting large numbers of people often is more efficient than seeking redress for each 
of many aggrieved individuals.”). 
 141. Marie A. Failinger and Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and 
Group Representation, 45 OHIO STATE L.J. 1, 17 (1984) (“[T]he class suit can secure relief for 
the client that is not only longer-lasting but also broader-based.”); Tushnet, supra note 108, at 
1713-18 (discussing the advantages of a class of ideological plaintiffs). 
 142. Heilman, supra note 113, at 251-52 (“Where a member of the organization has an 
actual injury and the expert organization has an interest in litigating the claim, the quality of the 
organization’s case presentation will potentially exceed that of the individual plaintiff.”); Scalia, 
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The potential benefits of ideological plaintiff classes rest upon 
the assumption that the interests of all of those injured by the 
challenged action will align.
143
  Divergence of interests may occur in 
all multi-party litigation, but the nature of public interest intellectual 
property cases, which contend with four imperfectly aligned interests 
(rights holder, rights user, large public domain, and strong private 
rights) and multiple stakeholders, makes them particular susceptible 
to this occurrence.  The Second Circuit noted in dictum that a 
proposed class of all holders of copyrights in books reproduced by 
Google, Inc. as part of its library project would most likely contain 
members who opposed the project, but also members who benefit 
from the project and therefore would disapprove of the plaintiffs’ 
efforts.
144
 
The jointness problem recognizes this possibility of diverging 
interests.
145
  In the case of a large, diffuse, and disorganized class, 
ideological lawyers may end up driving the case strategy and 
objectives.
146
  An ideological plaintiff may take aggressive steps to 
push the limits of the law, and therefore lose sight of the immediate 
needs of those suffering the direct injury.
147
  The dominant plaintiff 
may also define the objectives and strategy of the litigation to the 
detriment of the other litigants or non-litigants.
148
  Non-parties and 
 
supra note 59, at 891-92 (“Often the very best adversaries are national organizations such as the 
NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question 
at issue in the case, but no ‘concrete injury in fact’ whatever.”). 
 143. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1677 (“But it also follows that individuals can attach 
different values to such injuries, and that these values may be positive or negative.  This has 
important implications.”); Failinger and May, supra note 141, at 17 (“Law reform proponents 
have argued that emphasis on the group impact of cases, that is, the aggregate effect of a given 
case on the poor as a group, is the most effective way to combat the causes of poverty which 
invidiously affect individual poor persons.”). 
 144. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2013)  (reversing class 
certification since the fair use defense might resolve the issues in the case). 
 145. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1693 (“The inability to disaggregate governmental 
conduct that affects many at once will be called the jointness problem. . . . Understanding the 
jointness problem allows one to recognize another public-minded function of the injury-in-fact 
requirement: protecting individuals’ choices about the exercise of their rights.”). 
 146. Southworth, supra note 140, at 2451-52 (“Lawyers representing individuals in law 
reform litigation and lawyers handling class actions generally reported that they played more 
significant roles than did lawyers representing organizations or individuals where there was no 
law reform component.”); Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (discussing potential lack of 
accountability of lawyers to real clients in public interest litigation). 
 147. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (discussing potential lack of accountability of 
lawyers to real clients in public interest litigation). 
 148. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1677 (“If values can be either positive or negative, the 
ideological plaintiff’s interests may be opposed to the interests of other entitlement-holders 
within the class.  This can present problems because the ideological plaintiff is in effect 
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minority class members may find their interests unrepresented before 
the courts.
149
 
Faced with this possible divergence of strategies, the best 
resourced stakeholders may rush to the courthouse to define the 
litigation according to their own interests.
150
  The courts could 
become a battleground over multiple competing viewpoints on the 
public interest.  Liberal standing rules make this possibility more 
likely, since more stakeholders will meet the standing threshold.  
Setting a higher evidentiary threshold to establish that the plaintiff 
represents a public interest would help to address the problem of 
claims brought with inadequate representation.
151
  However, meeting 
such a standard would require the court and the parties to invest a 
substantial amount of time and money to gather, review, and test the 
evidence of representativeness.  This use of resources contravenes one 
goal of the standing doctrine—to engage in a threshold inquiry at the 
early stages of the dispute before the expenditure of significant 
resources. 
Even assuming that a plaintiff could establish the typicality of its 
position among the relevant population, should that shared belief 
entitle it to bring the action?  Disapproval of a government policy, 
even widely shared disapproval, does not compel a conclusion that 
the policy contradicts the public interest.  In some public interest 
litigation, the claims clearly align with an explicit statutory purpose of 
furthering a specific public interest, and the statute gives the general 
public certain rights of action to enforce that purpose  (e.g., 
minimizing pollution).
152
  By contrast, the intellectual property 
statutes do not express one explicit, enforceable public interest 
 
determining the disposition of the entitlements of the class as a whole.”). 
 149. Id. at 1678 (“Even if the dissenting class were small, identifiable, and closed, strategic 
behavior could foil socially valuable action because any one entitlement-holder exercises veto 
power over a government program that involves the entitlements of many.”). 
 150. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental 
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y FORUM 39, 79 (2001) (“In a sense, liberalized standing 
for citizen suits creates a new commons problem with over-litigation replacing overgrazing.”). 
 151. See Lynda J. Oswald, Challenging the Registration of Scandalous and Disparaging 
Marks Under the Lanham Act: Who Has Standing to Sue?, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 251 (2004) 
(questioning the adequacy of extrinsic evidence to support a claim that a mark disparages a 
plaintiff’s beliefs). 
 152. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000) (recognizing 
standing for environmental advocacy organization alleging  that members would suffer negative 
impacts to their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests from defendant’s mercury 
discharges). 
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purpose.
153
  Without that express statutory charge, the public interests 
underlying the statutes remain open to debate. 
Accordingly, claims brought on behalf of a public interest should 
arouse skepticism, and prompt the courts to pause to consider whether 
the self-appointed defender of the public domain actually represents 
the public interest.  Assuming that the plaintiff does present a 
plausible claim in support of a public interest, does that same plaintiff 
or another party in the dispute represent the other public interests?  
Can the plaintiff speak to the effects of the challenged action for 
restraints on speech, the incentives to produce new materials, the 
impact on competitors, and the costs incurred by consumers?  It 
seems unlikely that any one representative or even a class of litigants 
could represent all of these interests. 
5. Concrete Cases Illustrate Real Consequences 
Standing serves the further purpose of illuminating the real-
world effects of the challenged action on individuals to the court.
154
  
“The ‘abstract’ injury shunned by standing doctrine may lead to an 
‘abstract’ presentation of the issues involved, while courts are better 
suited to make incremental, fact-specific determinations.”155  In this 
way, the standing doctrine requirement “tends to assure that the legal 
questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified 
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context 
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial 
action.”156 
Public interest litigation tends to present plaintiffs with concrete 
cases because the counsel seeks lead plaintiffs who illustrate the 
consequences of the challenged action in a sympathetic and 
compelling manner.
157
  Public interest litigation specific to intellectual 
property claims raises special challenges with respect to the 
 
 153. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1301 (2012) (setting forth protections afforded under the 
Copyright Act and available causes of action, but not any enforceable public benefit); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2012) (setting forth the same). 
 154. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (“Isn’t a traditional plaintiff better able vividly to 
illustrate the adverse effects of the complained-of activity?”). 
 155. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1672 (discussing real-world effects rationale). 
 156. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).  See also Helen Hershkoff, Public Law Litigation: Lessons and 
Questions, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 157, 164 (2009) (“[G]iven the indeterminacy of legal 
norms, adjudication helps to create public meaning by providing a public space in which diverse 
actors have an opportunity to collaborate in the light of on-the-ground knowledge and local 
context.”). 
 157. Tushnet, supra note 108, at 1713-14 (1980) (discussing ideological lead plaintiffs). 
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illustration of real consequences.  Namely, one plaintiff will present a 
narrative about the immediate effects it will experience as a result of a 
copyright term extension or the granting of a patent for a gene 
sequence.  The case proceeds based on the story of that one narrator at 
that one moment in time.  Consistent with the binary tendency of 
reducing these issues to two-party property disputes, the case does not 
explore the more sweeping saga of the widespread or longer-term 
effects of more or less restrictive intellectual property protections.  
The discrete impact of one seed patent on one farmer does not inform 
the court about the effect of its decision on incentives for 
biotechnology firms to engage in research and development for 
biologically modified food products, the impact on competitors who 
may appreciate the access to the previously protected material but 
lament the loss of protection in the field, or the consequences for the 
food supply, international trade, and the economy.  The 
fundamentally public nature of these cases means that individual 
plaintiffs will rarely illuminate all of the public consequences of a 
policy for a court.  As such, the inherent structure of the courts as 
forums to decide adversarial disputes makes them ill-suited to 
consider such a multitude of narratives. 
Beneath the specter of the rush to the courthouse, each potential 
plaintiff must weigh its compelling narrative against the possibility 
that someone else has a better, or worse, or more representative, or 
less representative, case.  Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the first 
litigation on an issue may preclude all others from having the 
opportunity to present their narratives.  Thus, an adverse decision 
against the first litigant might preclude substantive review of the real-
world impacts on other stakeholders, even when those stakeholders 
have compelling narratives or experience the effects of the challenged 
protection in significantly different ways. 
After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Copyright Term Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a different set of 
plaintiffs (an organization seeking to make a free digital library of 
orphan works and an organization maintaining a free digital archive 
of creative works, principally films) brought another challenge to the 
Copyright Term Extension Act.
158
  In Kahle v. Gonzales, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the motion to dismiss the case because the Supreme 
Court had already held the statute constitutional in Eldred v. 
 
 158. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
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Ashcroft.
159
  In dismissing the case, the courts did not consider the 
real-world impacts of the CTEA on the Kahle plaintiffs.  Specifically, 
the free nature of plaintiffs’ services, the opening of broad public 
availability to works that might otherwise remain obscure or difficult 
to access, and the large reliance on orphan works distinguished the 
Kahle case from Eldred.
160
  The Kahle plaintiffs could not continue 
their businesses and comply with copyright law at the same time 
under the CTEA, while the Eldred plaintiffs would merely have had 
to make royalty payments—a real impact, but not a devastating one.  
The preclusive effect of Eldred meant that the courts did not get to 
consider the impact of the CTEA on entities that faced significant 
real-world consequences and that had an arguably more sympathetic 
case.  The Kahle case provides an example of the finality tendency 
since the result in Eldred served to foreclose any further consideration 
of the issues. 
These concerns matter because we want courts to make decisions 
based on real-world consequences.  In the context of public interest 
intellectual property cases, however, the decisions discussed in this 
article indicate that those real-world consequences do not impact the 
substantive analysis.  The courts consider whether a policy violates 
the Constitution or a statute, and the real-world impact of that policy 
makes no difference to the validity of the policy.  The decision in 
Myriad did not turn on the nature or extent of injuries suffered by 
Doctor Ostrer.
161
  The Federal Circuit discussed his activities in 
connection with the jurisdictional analysis, but did not mention him at 
all in the analysis of patent eligibility.
162
  The Supreme Court’s 
decision mentioned him only briefly in the factual summary and in a 
footnote acknowledging that he had standing.
163
  Likewise, neither 
Eldred nor Golan examined the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs in the 
considerations of constitutionality.
164
  Thus, viewing these cases from 
this perspective, the rush to the courthouse matters not because of the 
 
 159. Kahle, 487 F.3d at 698 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 162. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302, 1315-22 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
aff’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013). 
 163. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2115. 
 164. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884-94 (2012) (lacking discussion of injuries 
suffered by plaintiffs in consideration of validity of statute); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-222 
(lacking discussion of injuries alleged by plaintiffs in the assessment of the constitutional 
claims). 
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need to present the plaintiff with the most sympathetic facts, but 
rather the need to find the strongest advocate to argue the case. 
This observation about the lack of relevance of the facts of the 
individual plaintiffs in the substantive analysis counsels that the 
standing analysis should focus on the adequacy of representation to 
the exclusion of any consideration of injury.  Keeping in mind the 
finality tendency that public interest intellectual property litigation 
will usually offer the final word on the policy issues, effective 
representation will serve the courts and society in general better than 
a plaintiff with sympathetic facts.  In Organic Seed Growers, the 
seeds may not have had as direct an impact on the organic farmer 
plaintiffs as on other stakeholders, but the organic farmers had 
qualified counsel.
165
  The case presented legitimate questions about 
the proper scope of patent protection for seeds, none of which any 
branch of government will likely take up since the court declined to 
extend standing.
166
 
6. The Courts Function as Courts, Not Policy-Making 
Bodies 
The standing doctrine limits the role of the courts to adjudicating 
“concrete and particularized” disputes for the additional reason that 
the other branches of government have the responsibility to formulate 
and enact broadly applicable policies.
167
  The Constitution established 
a system of separation of powers that reflects the structural decision 
to vest certain decision-making power in the political processes.
168
  
Under this view, common problems shared by large groups properly 
belong to the popularly elected legislative and executive branches.
169
  
The courts cite standing as a reason to decline to adjudicate “abstract 
questions of wide public significance” and “generalized 
grievances.”170 
 
 165. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 178 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 222 (“The purposes include . . . preventing the anti-
majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making functions of the popularly 
elected branches.”). 
 168. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (“This is an essential limit on 
our power: It ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to 
elected representatives.”). 
 169. Elliott, supra note 54, at 462 (“Cases are sorted on a rough democratic theory: if an 
injury is shared by a large group of people, some cases suggest, such a group can and should 
take its problem to the legislature or the executive branch, not the courts.”). 
 170. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 
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Since courts usually do not inquire whether a plaintiff has 
alleged that it suffered an injury shared by many, the courts have not 
approached this consideration with consistency.
171
  As an example of 
the challenges arising from the application of this principle, consider 
Aharonian v. Gonzales.
172
  In this case, the Northern District of 
California dismissed the claim that software code qualified as an 
“idea” (and therefore exceeded the scope of protection afforded under 
copyright law) because the claim constituted a “generalized 
grievance.”173  At the same time, the court declined to dismiss other 
claims on standing grounds and proceeded to address the 
constitutionality of the definiteness of terms applicable to copyright 
protections in source code.
174
  In the court’s view, even though a 
pronouncement on constitutionality would affect many people, such 
claims did not constitute generalized grievances, since “standing 
depends only on whether plaintiff has alleged a concrete, particular 
harm.”175  From the plaintiff’s perspective, all of the claims arose 
from a “concrete, particular harm”—the protections for source code 
resulted in high costs for his business.  On the other hand, all of the 
claims also addressed restrictions applicable equally to all members 
of the public. 
This tension in Aharonian reflects the lack of consensus on the 
proper allocation of authority among each of the branches for 
deciding policy.  The legislature offers many advantages as a policy-
setting body.  Public policy formed through deliberative democracy—
the theory that lawmakers should develop public policy based on 
conversations about the public interest, and not solely on the 
legislator’s own viewpoint or the interests of a particular group—
allows for the contribution and consideration of multiple viewpoints 
on the public interest, as society comes to reasoned consensus on 
public policy formulated in furtherance of the public good.
176
  
 
179 (1974). 
 171. Elliott, supra note 54, at 481 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998)). 
 172. Aharonian v. Gonzales, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting motion to 
dismiss claims challenging the validity and scope of copyright protection in software source 
code). 
 173. Id. at 1454. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1453 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992)). 
 176. John J. Worley, Deliberative Constitutionalism, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 431, 442 (2009) 
(“In deliberating about matters of public concern, democratic citizens and their elected 
representatives must distance themselves from their own personal or group interests and 
impartially adopt laws, policies, and institutions that promote the interests of all citizens.”); 
Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. 
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Deliberative, representative, majoritarian bodies like Congress allow 
stakeholders to gather, present their interests, discuss and debate 
policy options, attempt to influence their elected representatives, and, 
after receiving feedback from the other constituents, moderate their 
proposals to make them more broadly attractive and inclusive of other 
stakeholders.
177
  The process of enacting legislation through 
committees and the full bodies in two chambers of Congress takes 
time, but that time allows for broad participation and consensus 
building.  The public accepts the legitimacy of laws because they 
have engaged in the deliberative process.
178
 
Accordingly, courts often defer to the legislature as the best 
forum for resolution of these questions.
179
  Otherwise, prompt access 
to the courts by ideological plaintiffs makes the courts into policy-
making bodies equal to the executive and legislative branches.
180
  The 
Supreme Court has characterized the term length of copyrights as a 
policy decision that rests with the legislative branch.  “Given the 
authority we hold Congress has, we will not second-guess the 
political choice Congress made between leaving the public domain 
untouched and embracing Berne unstintingly.”181  The Court declined 
to “reject the rational judgment Congress made” in how it thought 
 
AFFAIRS 371, 377 (2004) (“So one reason deliberative democrats emphasize deliberation is so 
that citizens’ judgments on laws and policies can be informed by consideration that all can 
reasonably accept in their capacity as democratic citizens.”). 
 177. William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1295 (2005) (“When 
advocates must articulate and defend their proposals to a variety of perspectives and not just to 
their core supporters, they are more likely to moderate and universalize those proposals.”). 
 178. Freeman, supra note 176, at 380 (“What matters most for deliberative theorists then is 
not hypothetical, but actual deliberation and agreement among free and equal citizens under the 
realized ideal conditions of deliberative democracy.  This is a necessary (if not also sufficient) 
condition for the legitimacy of laws and the proper exercise of political power.”). 
 179. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (holding that section 514 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, which met treaty obligations and revived copyrights in certain foreign 
works which had fallen into the public domain, did not violate the First Amendment or the 
Copyright Clause); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 667-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“[T]he establishment of a mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more suited 
for Congress than this Court.”), class certified and motion to dismiss denied, Nos. 05 Civ. 8136 
(DC), 10 Civ. 2977 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012), and class certification rev’d, 721 F.3d 132 
(2d Cir. July 1, 2013) (No. 12-3200-cv), remanded to No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
14, 2013) (dismissed on fair use grounds). 
 180. Jenny L. Maxey, A Myriad of Misunderstanding Standing: Decoding Judicial Review 
for Gene Patents, 113 W. VA. L. REV. CIR. 1033, 1068-69 (2011) (recognizing that the slow and 
deliberative nature of the legislative process is better suited to complex, multi-stakeholder issues 
like patentability of gene sequences); Scalia, supra note 59, at 893 (discussing separation of 
powers function of standing). 
 181. Golan, 133 S. Ct. at 887. 
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best to meet its Constitutional role to “promote the Progress of 
Science.”182  Such policy decisions do not fall to the courts for 
resolution.
183
  Whether or not the Congress made a wise decision, the 
Court should only determine whether it made a constitutional 
decision, and in the matter of copyright term lengths, Congress has 
great discretion under the Constitution.
184
  Along those lines, the 
Southern District of New York rejected a proposed settlement 
regarding the digitization of books because that policy decision rested 
with the legislative, as opposed to the judicial, branch.
185
 
Yet, the structure of the legislature does not always foment the 
development of public policy through robust deliberation.  The 
political branches may not provide adequate venues to address widely 
shared injuries, particularly when a large number of individuals suffer 
an injury so small or impersonal that it would make them unlikely to 
engage in political action to address the problem.
186
  A government 
based on deliberative democracy carries the additional risk of factions 
dominating the deliberative process and losing focus on the public 
interest.
187
  This concern has borne itself out in the copyright 
legislation enacted by Congress over the years.  Copyright law has not 
emerged from debate among legislators, but rather from negotiations 
between different industries with interests in the copyright regime.
188
  
Thus, although the mid-1990s witnessed two significant pieces of 
legislation impacting the term of copyright—the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act
189
 (the subject of Golan v. Holder) and the Copyright 
Term Extension Act
190
 (the subject of Eldred v. Reno), both of which 
expanded the scope of protection for copyrights—the lack of 
 
 182. Id. at 889. 
 183. Id. at 894 (“Nor is this a matter appropriate for judicial, as opposed to legislative 
resolution.”). 
 184. Id. (“The judgment §514 expresses lies well within the ken of the political branches.  
It is our obligation, of course, to determine whether the action Congress took, wise or not, 
encounters any constitutional shoal.”). 
 185. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 667-78 (“[T]he establishment of a 
mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more suited for Congress than this 
Court.”). 
 186. Siegel, supra note 109, at 101-02 (discussing the imbalance of incentives). 
 187. Stephen L. Elkin, Thinking Constitutionally: The Problem of Deliberative 
Democracy, 21 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POL'Y 39 (2004) (discussing the challenges of how a 
deliberative democracy will actually work). 
 188. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 53 (2001) (observing that Congress 
adopted legislation emerging from industry negotiations). 
 189. Act of Dec. 8, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 3809. 
 190. Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827. 
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engagement with multiple constituencies (including consumers, 
artists, performers, libraries, retailers, and others) led to a failure of 
widespread buy-in of the policy.  Unsuccessful at either gaining an 
audience in Congress or obtaining legislation consistent with their 
interests, some stakeholders turn to the courts, as witnessed in Golan 
and Eldred.
191
 
Besides allowing certain interest groups to dominate public 
policy formation on some issues, Congress has also declined to 
address certain issues at all.  This lack of action has led to some 
stakeholders asking the courts to fill that void.  For example, the 
recent copyright litigation has touched on the issue of orphan 
works.
192
  Although the Copyright Office issued a report on orphan 
works in 2006 with draft legislation, Congress has not taken action 
beyond subcommittee hearings in 2008.
193
  Likewise, Congress has 
not responded to the other concerns about terms extensions or the 
public domain raised in suits like Eldred v. Reno and Golan v. 
Holder.  Perhaps this lack of action signals that Congress remains 
committed to expansion of copyright protection, or perhaps it reflects 
that these stakeholders lack access to Congress. 
In the patent realm, a common refrain of criticism rings these 
days against patent “trolls” or “non-practicing entities”.194  These 
patent holders do not produce goods or exploit their inventions 
themselves, but rather seek to extract damages from others, many of 
whom use the patent unwittingly.
195
  Critics decry the unfairness of a 
 
 191. Elliott, supra note 54, at 491 (“Thus, dismissing a case because an injury is widely 
shared, on the assumption that the group will mobilize to obtain redress through the political 
branches, does not take into account the political reality that some groups have more access than 
others.”). 
 192. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007) (brought by non-profit organizations 
that provided the public with access to orphan works that otherwise would remain hard to 
access).  
 193. The "Orphan Works" Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement made by Marybeth Peters, Reg. of Copyrights), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON 
ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. 
 194. James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REG. 26, 35 
(2011) (arguing that patent trolls have resulted in the loss of over half a trillion dollars in wealth 
over between 1990 and 2010); Markus Reitzig et al., On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Prey – 
Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed,” 36 RESEARCH POL'Y 
134, 134 (2007) (arguing that patent “trolls” or “sharks” hold research and development groups 
captive). 
 195. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (“Defining a patent troll has proven a tricky business, but that does not 
mean the problem does not exist.”); Reitzig et al., supra note 194, at 134 (arguing that patent 
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system that allows these patent trolls to profit while they inhibit 
innovation by legitimate enterprises.
196
  Echoing the frustration of 
industry with these patent trolls, politicians have decried the bullying 
by these entities and the negative effects on growth and innovation.
197
  
While legislators have introduced bills that would seek to curb abuses 
arising from patent troll litigation, they have not introduced bills that 
would fix the policies or procedures that give rise to these troll 
patents.
198
  Namely, owners of patents have the right to exclude others 
from using the protected inventions.  If legislators believe that trolls 
assert claims based on overbroad, invalid, or “bad” patents, they 
should make this material ineligible for patent protection, change the 
standards for patent examination, or allocate more resources to the 
USPTO to support more thorough review.  Instead, the bills 
addressing the excesses of patent trolls propose changes to pleading 
standards, different venues for dispute resolution, and shifting of 
attorney fees back to an unsuccessful plaintiff.
199
 
The executive branch offers some advantages for setting policy.  
As a democratically elected branch it can claim to represent the will 
of the people.  The executive agencies have expert, specialized staff 
 
“trolls” or “sharks” hold research and development groups captive). 
 196. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14, 2013, at BU1 (profiling Eric Spangerberg, who sued 1,638 companies between 2008 and 
2013, and noting that U.S. companies spend $30 billion every year on patent litigation); Patent 
Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-
victims (last visited July 15, 2013). 
 197. Press Release, John Cornyn, U.S. Senator, Cornyn Introduces Bill to Curb Abusive 
Patent Litigation (May 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=082eaec
c-1983-41a7-b656-156c1b4b77cb (“[A]busive patent litigation, led by a growing number of 
‘patent trolls’ in search of a quick payday, threatens the innovation patents were created to 
protect.”); Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator, “Patent Trolls” Preying on New 
York’s Technology Industry with Unwarranted Lawsuits (May 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=341612 (observing that patent trolls 
cost operating companies $29 billion in suits in 2011). 
 198. John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 2111, 2130 
(2007) (“[E]nergy might be better directed to devising alternatives or improvements to today’s 
costly court proceedings—such as better initial screening of patents by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, more effective reexamination proceedings, or a new brand of administrative 
‘opposition’ proceedings.”). 
 199. Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199 
(2013) (creating cause of action by defendant in bad-faith patent lawsuit against party asserting 
the patent); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing limits 
on discovery, heightened pleading standards, and shifting of attorney fees); Saving High-Tech 
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013) (allowing 
successful defendant to recover attorney fees); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, 
H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013) (setting heightened pleading standards). 
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with deep policy knowledge. 
Yet, these agencies have limited authority and resources.  The 
USPTO lacks a mechanism to solicit and weigh public input on the 
extension of protection to every new category of technology.
200
  
Further resource constraints limit the extent of the review which the 
USPTO undertakes for the validity of patents, which means that some 
issues will not arise until competitors uncover prior art or the patentee 
begins exercising its interpretation of its rights.
201
  Moreover, the 
Copyright Office and the USPTO offer mechanisms to challenge 
registrations under only limited circumstances, such as identification 
of an incorrect owner on a copyright registration or reexamination of 
a patent based on prior art not considered during the initial review.
202
  
If someone wishes to challenge a registered patent or copyright on 
other grounds, including that patent or copyright protection should not 
extend to an entire category of materials, or that the registrant asserts 
rights beyond those afforded by the registration, these agencies do not 
have the authority to grant relief.  The challenger must petition the 
courts, which provide a “reasonably efficient and conclusive forum 
for the adjudication of validity.”203 
The courts offer certain other advantages for resolving policy 
questions.  In this venue, litigants may question “the presumptive 
legitimacy of majoritarian outcomes” and advocate for policy changes 
contrary to the views of the majority or the most powerful interests.
204
  
The anti-majoritarian nature of the courts makes them the forum in 
our tripartite government to seek redress by those who did not find 
success in a political branch.
205
  Narrow approaches to standing may 
 
 200. Kane, supra note 40, at 731 (2004) (“From a policy perspective, no mechanism for 
public input exists when the PTO readily embraces new technologies as patentable subject 
matter and issues patents that may elicit public concern and criticism, such as DNA gene 
patents.  The public interest concerns of nonapplicants cannot be channeled into any meaningful 
engagement with the PTO.”). 
 201. Kitch, supra note 30, at 345-46 (arguing that the courts do better than the Patent 
Office at making determinations on validity). 
 202. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-07 (2012) (setting forth provisions for seeking reexamination of 
any patent claim based on prior art); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510 (2013); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FORM 
CA FOR SUPPLEMENTARY REGISTRATION, (2006); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 8 
SUPPLEMENTARY COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION (2013). 
 203. Kitch, supra note 30, at 345-46 (arguing that the courts do better than the Patent 
Office at making determinations on validity). 
 204. Hershkoff, supra note 156, at 163 (arguing that courts act to undo democratically 
made decisions when the democratic process excludes affected groups or results in an outcome 
that impacts such groups in ways that do not align with the public interest set forth in the 
Constitution or statutes). 
 205. Elliott, supra note 54, at 491 (“Thus, dismissing a case because an injury is widely 
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therefore serve to exclude the disadvantaged from the political 
branches as well as the courts.
206
  If the standing doctrine blocks all 
individuals who could conceivably raise a particular issue from 
proceeding as plaintiffs, then the doctrine does not just keep out 
individuals, but rather entire issues as well.
207
  Someone wishing to 
challenge the validity of a patent often has no forum to seek relief 
other than the courts.
208
  An injury remains an injury, whether 
widespread or unique, and the injured party needs to have an authority 
to petition to redress the injury.
209
  For this very reason, Congress 
enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act to open the courts to consider 
patent validity challenges.
210
  The Supreme Court set forth a flexible 
and open test in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. to make it easier 
for challengers of allegedly invalid patents to access the courts.
211
 
Litigation also engages the public in policy debates in ways that 
legislative or executive action does not.  The initiation of the litigation 
introduces the assertions of the plaintiffs to the public discourse and 
helps to evolve society’s collective opinion.212  The Court may lead 
the way in recognizing a principle which the rest of the government 
will embrace over time.
213
  When the legislature or the executive 
 
shared, on the assumption that the group will mobilize to obtain redress through the political 
branches, does not take into account the political reality that some groups have more access than 
others.”); Scalia, supra note 59, at 894 (“There is, I think, a functional relationship, which can 
best be described by saying that the law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional 
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the 
majority . . . .”). 
 206. Nichol, supra note 51, at 304 (“The malleable, value-laden injury determination has 
operated to give greater credence to interests of privilege than to outsider claims of 
disadvantage.”). 
 207. Scalia, supra note 59, at 892 (discussing the effect of the standing doctrine on the 
allocation of powers). 
 208. La Belle, supra note 45, at 85 (discussing the role of the courts for patent validity). 
 209. Elliott, supra note 54, at 481 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)) (“[T]he 
fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is widely 
shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes.  Such 
an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an ‘injury in fact.’”). 
 210. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2013); La Belle, supra note 45, at 73 (discussing purpose of 
declaratory judgments for patents). 
 211. La Belle, supra note 45, at 85 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 
118, 127 (2007)). 
 212. Hershkoff, supra note 156, at 164 (finding that public law litigation “forms part of 
what sociologists call the new social movements in which participants contest public meaning”). 
 213. Id. (easing the other institutional actors to internalize new norms); Eskridge, supra 
note 177, at 1300 (“Because of inertia built into our representative democracy, the law does not 
always change as social norms move from one stage to the next.”).  In the past, the Supreme 
Court has led the way on social issues.  See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(ordering school desegregation before legislatures made such changes). 
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branch fails to act, litigation may offer the only alternative to prompt 
change.
214
  Adjudication by the courts may highlight issues not raised 
to the legislative branch or given inadequate attention in that venue, 
and open the door for Congress to take action based on the court’s 
informed opinion. 
If no venue exists for resolution of these issues by the 
government, then private parties will set de facto norms.  The more 
powerful interests will have the leverage to set the terms of 
engagement.  The government should step in when such terms do not 
reflect the public interest. 
7. Efficient Use of Scarce Judicial Resources 
Finally, by restricting access to the courts, the standing doctrine 
aims to cap the size of dockets, thereby making more efficient use of 
the limited resources of the federal courts.
215
  The structure of the 
federal courts lends itself best to resolution of discrete disputes 
between small numbers of parties and should devote its resources to 
these tasks.  Thus, for example, consideration of the multiple public 
interests that would inform the propriety of patent protection for 
broad categories of inventions makes inefficient use of court 
resources.
216
 
This rationale presumes that the courts will assess the standing of 
the parties as a preliminary question using a straightforward test that 
yields consistent results.
217
  Contrary to these presumptions, 
assessments of standing often require the parties and the courts to 
invest significant resources.  The plaintiff may need to gather and 
submit evidence to establish that it has suffered an injury.
218
  An 
 
 214. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, Meaningful Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary 
Role of the Courts, 85 NO. CAROL. L. REV. 1467, 1526-29 (2007) (stating that court actions have 
produced meaningful changes in education funding; even the filing of a complaint has prompted 
the executive branch to take action). 
 215. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) (“Standing 
doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts 
are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.”); Scalia, supra note 59, 
at 891 (“Standing, in other words, is only meant to assure that the courts can do their work well, 
and not to assure that they keep out of affairs better left to the other branches.”). 
 216. Maxey, supra note 180, at 1060. 
 217. Nichol, supra note 51, at 309 (“Standing is meant to be a mere preliminary 
jurisdictional inquiry. . . . Plaintiffs are either hurt or they are not.  Harms are either real or 
fanciful.  They are concrete or abstract, individual or shared, objective or subjective, particular 
or common, hypothetical or imminent.”). 
 218. E.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(reviewing twenty plaintiffs’ submitted declarations and other evidence of injury), aff’d in 
relevant part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
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appeal on a determination of standing requires the resources of 
another court.  If the appellate court reverses a dismissal based on 
lack of standing, the trial court must commence the substantive 
adjudication of the case, perhaps months or years after the plaintiff 
initiated the case.  Consider the Myriad litigation.  The plaintiffs filed 
suit in 2009 and the Federal Circuit did not issue its decision on the 
appeal on the standing issue until 2011, two years later—two years 
that might make a real difference to a cancer patient seeking to benefit 
from additional research on or diagnostics with the BRCA genes.
219
 
Dismissal of cases due to lack of standing may yield other 
inefficiencies.  Consider the scenario of a party seeking adjudication 
by the courts before it undertakes a potentially infringing action.
220
  If 
the court dismisses the case on grounds of standing, the litigant must 
decide to either undertake the infringing activity or forego the 
proposed use.  If the interested party decides to commence use, 
litigation may follow, but such litigation merely delays adjudication 
of the issues on the merits.  The user will assert a counterclaim or 
defense equivalent to its affirmative claims in the initial action.  The 
courts could have decided those issues in the first action rather than 
expending its resources on the standing analysis. 
On the other hand, if the party foregoes the contemplated use, 
the public will lose out on potentially beneficial new material.  
Declining to hear the merits of a case based on standing has the same 
practical effect as issuing a decision upholding the patent validity and 
avoids the challenging policy questions of the proper extent of patent 
protection.  For example, invalidation of seed patents could result in 
lower food prices since farmers would not have to pay to use seeds 
each year.  Or, invalidation might result in less investment by 
biotechnology firms in seed innovations since they will not benefit 
from the patent monopoly to recoup the research and development 
expenses.  Additionally, forestalling the invalidity question might 
curtail third-party derivative developments based on those seed 
patents, which remain subject to the control of the patent holder.  
Thus, while denial of standing may result in an incremental reduction 
in the use of court resources in the short-term, declining to decide the 
issues in the case may yield inefficiencies from a broader societal 
perspective. 
 
(2013). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Golden, supra note 198, at 2126-31 (discussing the options of a potential infringer 
based on the costs associated with either a license or litigation). 
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Any attempt to mitigate the problems arising from adjudication 
of public interest intellectual property cases in courts requires 
attention to the stakeholder access problem.  Given the limitations in 
the structure and resources of the federal courts, requiring or 
encouraging massive multi-party litigation does not present a 
workable solution.  Instead, a mechanism to seek and assess public 
comment could exist in the agencies responsible for intellectual 
property—the legislative branch’s Copyright Office and the executive 
branch’s USPTO.  The agency would compile the results of the public 
comments and present those comments and its recommendations in a 
report to the court.  This process would allow for stakeholder input, 
provide the court with broader inputs on the public interest, and 
inform the legislature of issues that might require legislative action. 
The procedure could work as follows.  Upon the initiation of a 
public interest intellectual property case, the court would approve a 
question or questions for public comment.  The parties could move to 
dismiss the action before commencement of the public comment 
period, but not on the grounds of standing, since the results of the 
public comment period would inform the issues of injury, 
representativeness, and effectiveness of representation in the standing 
analysis.  For instance, questions for the cases discussed in this 
Article might include the following: 
 
1. How do patents in seeds contribute to the progress of 
science? 
2. Do patents in seeds encourage or discourage more 
innovation for the public to enjoy? 
3. How do the copyright terms in the Copyright Term 
Extension Act contribute to the progress of the arts? 
4. Do copyright terms of this length result in the creation of 
more works for the public to enjoy? 
 
The agency would take the charge from the court and initiate a 
public comment period.  It would identify stakeholders—owners of 
impacted property rights, competitors, consumer advocacy groups, 
public domain advocacy groups—and invite them and anyone else in 
the public to submit comments on the action.  These agencies could 
efficiently identify and contact impacted stakeholders since they 
already know and engage with their stakeholder communities. 
In a somewhat analogous procedure currently employed for 
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another type of action with multiple stakeholders, the federal courts 
may direct counsel in class actions to distribute notice of the action to 
class members.
221
  Class counsel generally knows the members of the 
class and has an incentive to find the members in order to achieve a 
result that addresses the shared claims of the entire class.  In public 
interest intellectual property cases, the stakeholders do not belong to 
one class with shared beliefs.  In fact, some stakeholders will hold 
viewpoints on the policy contrary to those of the plaintiffs.  Thus, the 
plaintiffs do not have an incentive to locate all of the impacted 
stakeholders.  The court itself does not know who other than the 
litigants may speak to the effects of the policy.  If the court 
administered the public comment period, the proceeding could 
become quite adversarial and might resemble a bankruptcy hearing 
with multiple stakeholders claiming rights in the property.  The 
agencies, however, work with the stakeholders on a daily basis. 
The agency would take sixty days to identify stakeholders and 
open the issue for public comment for an additional sixty days.  After 
a further sixty days, it would issue its report.  The public-comment 
period would thus delay the litigation.  Yet, formation of public 
policy merits expenditure of time and other resources to understand 
the policy choices and their impact on the stakeholders.  This 
procedure offers a relatively efficient way to assess those options.  
Considering that the litigation discussed in this Article often lasted 
many years, a period of six months at the beginning of the litigation 
would not delay the matter substantially.  The benefit of gathering 
valuable information at the start of the litigation outweighs the harm 
of any delay. 
Further, the existence of a forum for stakeholders to advocate 
their interests to the government would counteract the binary 
tendency.  When the government inquires how a policy impacts a 
stakeholder, the government acknowledges that those views matter.  
The policy options expand beyond completely private rights or 
completely public rights to total-welfare-enhancing models, for 
example, compulsory licensing or limited fair use exceptions for 
research.  Even if the final policy ends up aligning with one of the 
two extremes, the engagement of the affected communities will lead 
to more buy-in by the stakeholders. 
The mere filing of one of these disputes might prompt the 
initiation of policy development by the executive or legislative 
 
 221. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
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branch.  This may, in turn, lead to suspension of the action as the 
parties participate in the policy development through the other 
branches. 
As a result of the initiation of the public comment period, 
additional stakeholders will learn of the litigation.  They then might 
voluntarily join as parties to the litigation.  This development would 
offer the advantage of providing the court with more viewpoints and 
more briefing on the issues.  On the other hand, the addition of 
multiple parties could make the litigation unwieldy.  However, that 
possibility exists even today since stakeholders already have the 
option to attempt to join as parties.  In the event of a massive multi-
party litigation, the court would still have the option to dismiss parties 
for lack of standing.  If it does so, it should pay particular attention to 
the adequacy of representation, since, as discussed in this Article,
222
 
the injuries suffered by the particular plaintiffs do not change the 
answers to the substantive questions.  For those parties who do remain 
in the case, the court could suggest that parties with overlapping 
interests combine their resources and a designated representative 
would submit briefs and motions on behalf of all of the parties sharing 
the same interests. 
The agencies would consider the comments in light of the 
questions posed by the court as well as their general duty to consider 
the public interest in their work.
223
  This obligation towards the public 
interest extends to both the public benefits of expanding protection 
and the public harms of contracting protection.  The agency would 
compile the comments with these considerations in mind and issue its 
own recommendation based on these inputs and its expert opinion. 
The court could give as much or as little weight to the agency 
report as it deemed appropriate based on the circumstances of the 
case.  In more discrete cases, the additional information would most 
likely confirm the positions advocated by the parties to the suit.  In 
more complex cases with wider effects, the contributions from the 
public would illuminate the broader set of real-world consequences.  
Nonetheless, the report might not have any impact on the questions 
the court would need to decide.  For instance, the opinions of various 
constituencies that longer copyright terms would not result in the 
production of more works for the public to enjoy would not dispose of 
the constitutional question of Congress’s authority to set term 
 
 222. See discussion supra Part III.B.5. 
 223. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Board has a duty to 
obtain the views of the affected public.”). 
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lengths.
224
  The report, however, would nonetheless aid the court in 
understanding the public impact of the legislation.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the report would inform the executive and legislative 
branches of the public’s views of the policy and if they should 
consider changes to the policy.  The public-comment period thus 
would serve the important role of engaging constituents in the policy-
making process. 
Given the potential value of the public-comment period, it might 
seem appropriate to require the agencies to initiate this mechanism 
even if litigation has not commenced.  This Article has focused on the 
challenges of litigation, and this proposal specifically addresses those 
challenges by providing a mechanism to inject the policy implications 
into the litigation.  The court’s questions define the purpose and scope 
of the public-comment period.  Without this direction, the agencies 
would not have direction on when to initiate this process, and would 
often lack the authority to implement any policy changes without new 
legislative action.  Thus, policy recommendations submitted to 
Congress sua sponte will likely fall flat. 
After the court issues its decision, the legislative or executive 
branch may seek to change the policy within the bounds set forth by 
the court.  These branches will benefit from the court’s analysis, the 
public input, and the agency’s recommendation.  The stakeholders 
will have engaged with the policy issue through their participation in 
the public-comment period and, having ownership in the issue, may 
seek to influence the other branches to change the policy. 
Without this process, stakeholders will face many instances 
where no branch considers the issues raised by the litigants.  
Significant stakeholders should have the opportunity to present their 
concerns and have the government consider those inputs, particularly 
in the face of a substantial policy shift.  This mechanism would open 
up that opportunity and thereby counteract the finality tendency. 
This Article has argued that the current interaction of standing 
with public interest intellectual property cases leaves some issues 
without a forum for resolution.  This proposal does not guarantee that 
a governmental body will resolve the issue of orphan works, for 
example.  But, the process would engage the stakeholders and force 
 
 224. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (upholding Copyright Term Extension 
Act not because such a term would or would not result in the production of more works, but 
rather because a term of life plus seventy years met the constitutional restriction to “limited 
times”). 
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the agency to take a position on the issue.
225
  It would also serve to 
develop a record of the consequences of current policy on orphan 
works.  Perhaps, these steps would suffice to move the policy process 
along so that the executive or legislative branch would change the 
policy. 
Even if the government did not change a policy based on these 
inputs, the opening up of the policy process to multiple stakeholders 
would change the dynamics away from the private capture of public 
interests.  This Article has discussed public interest intellectual 
property cases that define the disputes as control over the property by 
the purported rights holder or by the plaintiff.  The rights holder seeks 
to retain exclusive control, while the plaintiff seeks to wrest such 
exclusivity from the rights holder in favor of free access.  When 
multiple stakeholders participate in the policy process, the framing of 
the issue shifts, focusing instead on how to enhance the welfare of all 
of the stakeholders.  They all benefit from development of the 
material and no one group of stakeholders will dictate control of the 
material. 
CONCLUSION 
The role of the courts matters in disputes over intellectual 
property policy, because the tension between private rights and public 
rights will not go away.  Technological and scientific innovation 
multiplies the volume of new information goods at a breakneck rate, 
but this pace of development also makes it more challenging for 
rights holders to protect their goods.  The need to stay ahead of the 
curve and offer a competitive advantage creates pressures to stake 
rights as broadly as possible.
226
  Less than a month after the Supreme 
Court invalidated Myriad’s patents in the isolated BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 gene sequences, Myriad filed multiple suits against 
laboratories offering testing for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene 
sequences.
227
  Organizations like the Electronic Frontier 
 
 225. The Copyright Office has taken the lead on the orphan works issue and developed 
draft legislation, which has not moved out of committee.  The "Orphan Works" Problem and 
Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Reg. of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html; 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (Jan. 2006).  Litigation with stakeholder 
engagement might provide more impetus for Congress to respond to the proposal. 
 226. Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 698-99 (“[N]obody wants to be the last one 
left dedicating findings to the public domain.”). 
 227. Complaint, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Gene By Gene Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-
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Foundation and the Public Patent Foundation have dedicated 
themselves to fighting this trend and have robust litigation 
programs.
228
  With Congress unable or unwilling to address many of 
these issues, organizations like this will continue to seek resolution of 
these issues in the courts.
229
 
Without some modification to the process for resolving these 
disputes, the trend toward private capture of public interests 
will intensify.  Each side will initiate litigation to seek to enforce 
the rights or to invalidate those rights.  The binary tendency 
will reinforce this trend as the victories in litigation encourage 
the parties to try to move the line in the sand.  Under-organized 
or under-resourced constituencies will watch from the sidelines as 
the courts mediate the balance between private rights and the 
public domain.  The finality tendency will continue to leave 
certain issues undecided and impose opportunity costs on 
those considering using or adapting the material, leading to 
foregone developments which the public might have enjoyed.  
Enhanced engagement with a wider range of stakeholders, 
possible through the public-comment period, will help to change 
 
00643-EJF (D. Utah July 10, 2013) (including Myriad Genetics, Inc. as one of five plaintiffs 
alleging that defendants’ genetic testing infringes multiple patents); Complaint, Univ. of Utah 
Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS (D. Utah July 9, 2013) 
(including the same). 
 228. About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, www.eff.org/about (last visited 
July 24, 2013) (“From the beginning, EFF has championed the public interest in every critical 
battle affecting digital rights. . . . EFF fights for freedom primarily in the courts, bringing and 
defending lawsuits even when that means taking on the US government or large corporations.”); 
PUBLIC PATENT FOUNDATION, www.pubpat.org (last visited July 24, 2013) (“Undeserved 
patents and unsound patent policy harm the public by making things more expensive, if not 
impossible to afford; by preventing scientists from advancing technology; by unfairly 
prejudicing small businesses; and by restraining civil liberties and individual freedoms.  PubPat 
represents the public’s interests against undeserved patents and unsound patent policy.”). 
 229. General media sources decry the recent overall inaction by Congress.  E.g., Sean 
Sullivan, Everything You Need to Know about the Politics of the Student Loan Fight, 
WASHINGTON POST (July 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/07/01/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-politics-of-the-student-loan-fight/ 
(observing that gridlock characterizes Congress and led to a spike in student loan rates);  94 
Percent of Americans Say Congressional Inaction Harming Economy, NO LABELS (Dec. 1, 
2011), http://www.nolabels.org/press-releases/no-labels-poll-94-percent-americans-say-
congressional-inaction-harming-economy.  Specifically regarding public interest intellectual 
property issues, Congress has failed to act on the issue of orphan works although the Copyright 
Office drafted legislation intended to provide incremental relief for the problems resulting from 
the inability to locate the owners of copyrighted works.  See The “Orphan Works” Problem and 
Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Reg. of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html. 
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the approach of intellectual property policy to greater focus on the 
public interest. 
 
